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I. INTRODUCTION
Every year about twenty million Americans are crime victims.1 More than
sixteen million are victims of crimes involving property.2 Many criminal code
victims (and many others undesignated as victims under the criminal laws) suffer
personal injury as well as other readily ascertainable losses. Crimes often involve
state statutes that are only enforceable in state courts. For all state crime victims,
there is typically an array of avenues to monetary recoveries for related losses.
These are chiefly provided by constitutions, statutes, and common law rulings.
Unfortunately, many victims go without recovery even when assets are or may be
available. Are there better ways to secure recoveries for losses resulting from
crimes?
Recoveries typically are available through three avenues: a criminal case (with or
without a formal charge); a related civil case (including a presuit settlement); and a
related administrative or special court proceeding. A single crime victim may
employ more than one avenue, at times simultaneously.
This paper examines the three avenues of recoveries available to state crime
victims, though it also briefly explores recoveries in the federal courts. State crime
victim recovery avenues often are, and should be, broader than recovery avenues
available in federal courts. While there are currently no express federal
constitutional crime victim rights, many state constitutions expressly recognize at
least some such rights, including recovery rights.3 While certain state constitutional
crime victim recovery rights are largely, if not exclusively, dependent upon enabling
legislation, others are not.4 Explicit state constitutional recognition of crime victim
recovery should at least elevate crime victim interests when legislatures and courts
act.
Broader state crime victim recovery avenues are also generally more available
because unlike federal district courts, they are not limited by subject matter
jurisdictional constraints. Article III of the Constitution leaves many recovery
claims, involving both federal and state crimes, outside federal court authority. State
trial court jurisdictional authority typically is unlimited.
Because of the breadth and availability of state recovery avenues, crime victims
often utilize them even for federal law crimes. First of all, diversity of citizenship
and amount in controversy requirements for the Article III courts often are not met
where there are federal crimes. Furthermore, any supplemental authority in the
federal courts is discretionary and has been largely unrecognized in federal statutes.5
There is also no explicit federal legislation on Article III court jurisdiction involving
many crime victim recoveries tied to federal crimes. By contrast, most state trial
courts enjoy expansive jurisdictional authority, including subject matter authority

1

MICHAEL R. RAND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY:
CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2008, at 1 (2009) (21,312,400 people).
2

Id. (16,455,890 people).

3

Infra Part II.A.

4

Infra Part III.A.

5

See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West 2010).
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over recoveries sought by federal crime victims. For example, the Illinois circuit
courts are constitutionally vested with jurisdiction over “all justiciable matters.”6
The broader avenues for crime victim recoveries in state courts are also
facilitated by procedures that could never be employed in the federal courts. For
example, the federal constitutional civil jury trial right that applies in federal district
courts does not operate in state courts.7 State constitutional civil jury trial
procedures at times do not follow federal practices. Even when the state
constitutional language on civil juries appears comparable to the Seventh
Amendment federal civil jury trial right, state constitutional civil jury trials may be
conducted differently in both large and small ways.8
In this Article, we explore the constitutional, statutory, and common law
foundations of the three recovery avenues available to crime victims. We also
explore the federal-state and interstate differences in these avenues, along with the
associated barriers to recovery. Finally, we propose better ways in which to
facilitate state crime victim recoveries.
II. CONTENTS AND ENFORCEMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CRIME VICTIM
RECOVERIES
A. Contents
In contrast to the federal Constitution, several American state constitutions
address crime victim recoveries. The Louisiana Constitution provides for “the right
to seek restitution.”9 In the Rhode Island Constitution, there is a right for a “victim
of crime . . . to receive, from the perpetrator of the crime, financial compensation.”10
In South Carolina, “victims of crime” have a right to “prompt and full restitution
from the person or persons convicted.”11 The California Constitution says: “It is the
unequivocal intention of the People . . . that all persons who suffer losses as a result
of criminal activity shall have the right to seek and secure restitution from the
persons convicted . . . [for] losses they suffer.”12 It further provides that
“[r]estitution shall be ordered . . . in every case . . . in which a crime victim suffers a
loss.”13
In Rhode Island,14 Wisconsin,15 Texas,16 and Georgia17 there are

6

ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9. See also IND. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (“The Circuit Courts shall
have such civil and criminal jurisdiction as may be prescribed by law.”).
7

Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1876).

8

This is because of differences such as the amount in controversy, the number of jurors
needed, and the need for unanimity. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VII ($20); HAWAII CONST.
art. I, § 13 ($5000); People v. Lobb, 161 N.E.2d 325, 331 (Ill. 1959) (requiring unanimity and
twelve jurors); Colgrove v. Barrin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973) (requiring six jurors); OR.
CONST. art. VII, § 5 (three-fourths of jury may render verdict).
9

LA. CONST. art. I, § 25.

10

R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23.

11

S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24.

12

CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(13)(A).

13

Id. § 28(b)(13)(B). See also ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A)(8) (“To preserve and protect
victims’ rights to justice and due process, a victim of crime has a right . . . [t]o receive prompt
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constitutional provisions on crime victim “compensation” available from state funds.
As these examples show, recoveries by crime victims under American state
constitutions may apply in civil cases, criminal cases, as well as administrative
proceedings that may involve payments made by the state rather than the criminals.
State constitutions vary on who constitutes a crime victim entitled to possible
recoveries. Some states, such as California,18 Illinois,19 Texas,20 and Wisconsin,21
broadly recognize crime victim recoveries by not expressly limiting them to those
hurt by convicted criminals. Other states, such as Arizona22 and Oklahoma,23 have
narrower constitutional provisions that make recovery only available from those

restitution from the person or persons convicted of the criminal conduct that caused the
victim’s loss or injury.”).
14

R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“A victim of crime shall, as a matter of right . . . be entitled to
receive, from the perpetrator of the crime, financial compensation for any injury or loss
caused by the perpetrator of the crime, and shall receive such other compensation as the state
may provide.”).
15

WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m (“This state shall ensure that crime victims have all of the
following privileges and protections as provided by law . . . [including] restitution [and]
compensation . . . .”).
16

TEX. CONST. art. I, § 31(a)-(b) (“The compensation to victims of crime fund created by
general law and the compensation to victims of crime auxiliary fund created by general law
are each a separate dedicated account . . . . [M]oney deposited to the credit of the
compensation to victims of crime fund or the compensation to victims of crime auxiliary fund
. . . may be expended as provided by law only for delivering or funding victim-related
compensation, services, or assistance.”).
17

GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 6(f) (“The General Assembly shall be authorized to
allocate certain funds, to appropriate funds, to provide for a continuing fund, or to provide for
any combination thereof for the purpose of compensating innocent victims of crime and for
the administration of any laws enacted for such purpose.”).
18

CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(13) (“a victim shall be entitled to . . . restitution”).

19

ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(a)(10) (“Crime victims, as defined by law, shall have . . . [t]he
right to restitution.”).
20

TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30 (“A crime victim has . . . the right to restitution.”).

21

WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m (“This state shall ensure that crime victims have all the
following privileges and protections as provided by law . . . restitution [and]
compensation . . . .”).
22

ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A)(8) (“[A] victim of crime has a right . . . [t]o receive
prompt restitution from the person or persons convicted of the criminal conduct that caused
the victim’s loss or injury.”). See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2401 (2010) (victims can
collect from a compensation fund).
23

OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34 (“[A]ny victim or family member of a victim of a crime has
the right . . . to be awarded restitution by the convicted person for damages or losses . . . .”).
See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 142.1 (West 2010) (victims can collect from a
compensation fund).
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convicted, thereby making preindictment and many postindictment settlements of
crime victim claims more difficult.24
There are further distinctions between states on who constitutes a crime victim.
Some state constitutions, as in Arizona25 and Rhode Island,26 employ the term
“victim” without recognizing in the legislature express definitional authority. By
contrast, in other states the General Assembly is empowered to define the victims
entitled to constitutional crime victim recovery.27
The Oklahoma Constitution expressly includes family members as victims
entitled to restitution.28 Other states more narrowly define eligible victims. In New
Jersey29 and New Mexico,30 the state constitutional definitions encompass only
certain crimes or only certain victims. The Louisiana Constitution employs a broad
24
At times, whether only convicted criminals are contemplated is unclear to us. See
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (“Crime victims, as defined by law, shall have . . . the right to
restitution from the accused . . . .”); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22 (“A crime victim, as defined by
statute, has the . . . right[] . . . [t]o restitution, as provided by law, from the person committing
the offense that caused the victim’s loss.”); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35 (“[V]ictims shall be
entitled to . . . [t]he right to restitution from the offender.”).
25
ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(C) (“‘Victim’ means a person against whom the criminal
offense has been committed or, if the person is killed or incapacitated, the person’s spouse,
parent, child or other lawful representative, except if the person is in custody for an offense or
is the accused.”).
26
R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“A victim of crime shall, as a matter of right, be treated by
agents of the state with dignity, respect and sensitivity during all phases of the criminal justice
process. Such person shall be entitled to receive, from the perpetrator of the crime, financial
compensation for any injury or loss caused by the perpetrator of the crime, and shall receive
such other compensation as the state may provide.”).
27

See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (“[c]rime victims, as defined by law”); CONN. CONST.
art. I, § 8 (“a [crime] victim, as the General Assembly may define by law”); IDAHO CONST. art.
I, § 22 (“[a] crime victim, as defined by statute”); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1 (“[c]rime victims, as
defined by law”); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24 (“[c]rime victims, as defined by law”); MO.
CONST. art. I, § 32 (“crime victims, as defined by law”); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m (“[c]rime
victims, as defined by law”).
28

OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34 (“[A]ny victim or family member of a victim has the right . . .
to be awarded restitution . . . .”).
29
N.J. CONST. art. I, § 22 (“For the purposes of this paragraph, ‘victim of a crime’ means:
(a) a person who has suffered physical or psychological injury or has incurred loss of or
damage to personal or real property as a result of a crime or an incident involving another
person operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and (b) the
spouse, parent, legal guardian, grandparent, child or sibling of the decedent in the case of a
criminal homicide.”).
30
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24(A)(8) (“A victim of arson resulting in bodily injury,
aggravated arson, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, dangerous use of explosives,
negligent use of a deadly weapon, murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter,
kidnapping, criminal sexual penetration, criminal sexual contact of a minor, homicide by
vehicle, great bodily injury by vehicle or abandonment or abuse of a child or that victim’s
representative shall have the following rights as provided by law . . . the right to restitution
from the person convicted of the criminal conduct that caused the victim’s loss or
injury . . . .”).
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definition of “victim” for the purposes of certain nonrecovery rights, but defers to
the legislature for a definition of victims eligible for recoveries.31
State constitutional provisions also vary on where a crime victim recovery right
may be pursued.
As noted above, state-funded schemes are sometimes
contemplated. Some state constitutions declare a broad right to restitution,
suggesting recoveries can be pursued in several different fora. In Missouri, crime
victims have the right to restitution, “which shall be enforceable in the same manner
as any other civil cause of action, or as otherwise provided by law.”32 Other states,
including Connecticut,33 Oregon,34 and Virginia,35 provide for express crime victim
recovery rights only in criminal cases.
Not all state constitutions that contain explicit nonrecovery rights, like rights
regarding notices of proceedings36 and opportunities to present evidence,37 also
contain provisions on crime victim recoveries.38 Thus, occasionally nonmonetary
crime victim rights are constitutionally recognized without any recovery avenues
being explicitly recognized.39

31

LA. CONST. art. I, § 25 (“Any person who is a victim of crime shall be treated with
fairness, dignity, and respect, and shall be informed of the rights accorded under this Section.
As defined by law, a victim of crime shall have the right . . . to seek restitution . . . .”).
32
MO. CONST. art. I, § 32 (“Crime victims, as defined by law, shall have the following
rights, as defined by law . . . [t]he right to restitution, which shall be enforceable in the same
manner as any other civil cause of action, or as otherwise provided by law . . . .”).
33
CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8(b) (“In all criminal prosecutions, a victim, as the General
Assembly may define by law, shall have the following rights . . . the right to restitution . . . .”).
34

OR. CONST. art. I, § 42 (“[T]he following rights are hereby granted to victims in all
prosecutions for crimes and in juvenile court delinquency proceedings . . . the right to receive
prompt restitution from the convicted criminal who caused the victim’s loss or injury . . . .”).
35
VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-A (“That in criminal prosecutions, the victim . . . may be accorded
. . . [t]he right to restitution . . . .”).
36

See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28 (“A victim of crime . . . shall have . . . [t]he right to be
informed of all criminal court proceedings . . . .”).
37

See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6.01(a) (“Crime victims, as defined by law or their
lawful representatives, including the next of kin of homicide victims, are entitled to the
right . . . to be heard when authorized, at all crucial stages of criminal proceedings, to the
extent that these rights do not interfere with the constitutional rights of the person accused of
committing the crime.”).
38
See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16; IND. CONST. art. I, § 13. Florida’s crime victim rights
provision was the first in the nation. William A. Buzzett & Deborah K. Kearney,
Commentary to the 1988 and 1998 Amendments, FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16 (West Supp. 2010).
39
See ALA. CONST. art. I, §6.01(a) (providing only that crime victims are entitled to “the
right to be informed, to be present, and to be heard when authorized, at all crucial stages of
criminal proceedings, to the extent that these rights do not interfere with the constitutional
rights of the person accused”); IND. CONST. art. I, § 13 (victim rights are found under the
provision on the rights of the criminally accused: “Victims of crime . . . shall have the right to
be treated with fairness, dignity, and respect throughout the criminal justice process; and . . .
to be informed of and present during public hearings and to confer with the
prosecution . . . .”).
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Some American state constitutions leave the details of crime victim recoveries to
the legislature.40 Two constitutions expressly recognize a responsibility for crime
victim restitution in the “Legislature, or the people by initiative or referendum.”41
Although the Montana Constitution does not contain an explicit right to crime victim
recovery, it does direct the legislature to provide “[l]aws for the punishment of
crime” to be “founded on the principles of prevention, reformation, public safety,
and restitution for victims.”42 By contrast, in Oregon the constitution is silent with
respect to the role of the legislature in constitutional crime victim recovery.43
Unlike many states where crime victims “shall have” or “shall be entitled to”
certain rights,44 the constitutional provisions on crime victims rights in Wisconsin
simply place duties regarding crime victims on the state.45 In Texas46 and Georgia47
there are recognized legislative responsibilities for providing state funds to
compensate crime victims. In Virginia the constitution imposes affirmative duties
on state employees, officers, and agents, regarding certain crime victim rights, but
has permissive language regarding other rights, including restitution.48
40
CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8 (restitution enforceable as “provided by law”); MO. CONST. art.
I, § 32 (“Crime victims, as defined by law shall have the following rights, as defined by
law . . . [t]he right to restitution, which shall be enforceable . . . as otherwise provided by
law . . . .”).
41

ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(D); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34(C).

42

MONT. CONST. art. II, § 28(1).

43

OR. CONST. art. I, § 42 (“the following rights are hereby granted to victims in all
prosecutions for crimes and in juvenile court delinquency proceedings: . . . [t]he right to
receive prompt restitution from the convicted criminal who caused the victim’s loss or
injury”).
44

See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (“[c]rime victims, as defined by law, shall have the
following rights”); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b) (“a victim shall be entitled to the following
rights”); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 37 (“[v]ictims of crime, as prescribed by law, shall be entitled to
the following basic rights”); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35 (“[t]o preserve and protect the rights of
victims of crime to justice and due process, victims shall be entitled to the following basic
rights”).
45
WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m (“This state shall treat crime victims, as defined by law, with
fairness, dignity and respect for their privacy. This state shall ensure that crime victims have
all of the following privileges and protections as provided by law . . . .”).
46
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 31 (“The compensation to victims of crime fund created by general
law and the compensation to victims of crime auxiliary fund created by general law are each a
separate dedicated account in the general revenue fund. . . . [M]oney deposited to the credit of
the compensation to victims of crime fund or the compensation to victims of crime auxiliary
fund from any source may be expended as provided by law only for delivering or funding
victim-related compensation, services, or assistance.”).
47
GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 6(f) (“General Assembly shall be authorized to allocate
certain funds, to appropriate funds, to provide for a continuing fund, or to provide for any
combination thereof for the purpose of compensating innocent victims of crime and for the
administration of any laws enacted for such purpose.”).
48
VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-A (“That in criminal prosecutions, the victim shall be accorded
fairness, dignity and respect by the officers, employees and agents of the Commonwealth and
its political subdivisions and officers of the courts and, as the General Assembly may define
and provide by law, may be accorded rights to reasonable and appropriate notice, information,
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As noted, many state constitutions accompany recovery rights with additional
crime victim rights. Accompanying nonrecovery rights include rights to be treated
with fairness, respect, and dignity;49 to be present at certain proceedings;50 and to be
heard, consulted or informed of the progress of the criminal case.51
State constitutions without explicit crime victim recovery rights sometimes invite
judicial construction. Similar to the Ninth Amendment to the federal Constitution, a
state constitution can leave open the possibility of a nonexplicit constitutional right,52
meaning a judicially-recognized right. The Arizona Constitution says: “The
enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights for victims shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others granted by the Legislature or retained by victims.”53
A few American state constitutions recognize particularly strong crime victim
recovery rights. Although the Idaho Constitution grants its legislature “the power to
enact laws to define, implement, preserve, and expand the rights guaranteed to
victims,” it also says that the constitutional rights “shall be self-enacting.”54 Without
a self-execution clause and with some room for legislation, the Rhode Island
Constitution declares that a “victim of crime . . . shall be entitled to receive, from the
perpetrator of the crime, financial compensation for any injury or loss caused by the
perpetrator . . . and shall receive such other compensation as the state may
provide.”55 The California Constitution provides that crime victims, as a matter of
right, receive some priority, stating that “[a]ll monetary payments, monies, and
property collected . . . shall be first applied to pay the amounts ordered as restitution
to the victim.”56
B. Enforcement
Most American high courts have not significantly considered their own state
constitutional provisions on crime victim recoveries. Thus, many enforcement
issues remain uncertain. Courts have, however, considered enforcement of other
express constitutional crime victim rights. The results have varied.
1. Alaska
The Alaska Court of Appeals rejected a criminal defendant’s challenge to his
conviction based, inter alia, on the presence of the witness/crime victim in the

restitution, protection, and access to a meaningful role in the criminal justice process. These
rights may include, but not be limited to . . . [t]he right to restitution . . . .”).
49

See, e.g., OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34(A).

50

See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, §24 (when the accused has the right to be present).

51

See, e.g., TENN. CONST. art. I, §35.

52

The Ninth Amendment states that the “enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights” should not be construed “to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” U.S.
CONST. amend. IX.
53

ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(E).

54

IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22(10).

55

R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23.

56

CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28.
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courtroom.57 Her presence was founded on article I, section 24 of the Alaska
Constitution, which says: “Crime victims, as defined by law, shall have . . . the right
. . . to be present at all criminal or juvenile proceedings where the defendant has the
right to be present.”58 The criminal defendant argued that the provision was not selfexecuting and (at the time of his trial) had no implementing legislation.59 The
appellate court found no error.60
The court cited an Alaska constitutional provision saying that “to the extent
possible, all provisions of this constitution shall be construed to be self-executing.”61
While the court recognized that the constitutional language, “‘crime victim’ by
‘law’” and the “rights ‘as provided by law,’” did authorize “the legislature to enact
procedures to govern crime victims’ exercise of the listed rights—and perhaps to
define the scope of those rights in particular situations,”62 the court nevertheless
found the person before it was clearly a “victim” of the defendant’s crimes having
the constitutional right to be present since the defendant had the right to be present.63
The court declared that the case at hand was “one of the ‘core’ situations described”
in the Alaska Constitution, making implementing legislation unnecessary.64 Thus,
core attributes of the constitutional right to crime victim recovery65 might also be
judicially defined in Alaska even when there is no legislation.
2. New Jersey
A somewhat different issue involving a crime victim’s presence at a criminal
proceeding was resolved, in part, on constitutional grounds in New Jersey two years
earlier.66 There, the trial court held that a juvenile victim had standing to oppose a
newspaper’s request to be present at the trial of another juvenile charged with sexual
assault.67 The court ruled that because press access would result in “specific harm to
the victim,” the press could not be present.68 The court utilized the state
constitutional Victims’ Rights Amendment, which says not only that “[a] victim of a
crime shall be entitled to those rights and remedies as may be provided by the
Legislature,” but also that the victim has the right to be “treated with fairness,

57

Landon v. Alaska, No. A-6479, 1999 WL 46543, at *1 (Alaska. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1999).

58

Id. at *2

59

Id.

60

Id. at *2-3.

61

Id. (citing ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 9).

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (“Crime victims, as defined by law, shall have the following
rights as provided by law . . . the right to restitution from the accused”).
66

State ex rel. K.P., 709 A.2d 315 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997).

67

Id. at 322.

68

Id. at 328.
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compassion and respect by the criminal justice system.”69 The court concluded that
the latter, a “fundamental right,” supported a finding of “an unarticulated right to
oppose a petition by the press,”70 especially as the victim had shown sufficient
potential harm to justify closure.71 The New Jersey Constitution is silent on crime
victim recovery.
3. Wisconsin
By contrast, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that the opening sentence of
its constitutional crime victim rights provision, guaranteeing “crime victims, as
defined by law,” treatment “with fairness, dignity and respect,” was merely a
“statement of purpose” describing “the policies to be promoted by the State” and, as
such, offered no enforceable, self-executing rights.72 Thus, the provision could not
be used by the Crime Victims Rights Board to justify a private reprimand of a
district attorney for causing harm to the crime victim’s family by playing a
particularly traumatic 911 tape at a sentencing hearing.73
The Wisconsin court considered three sources for constitutional interpretation:
“the plain meaning of the words in the context used; the constitutional debates and
the practices in existence at the time of the writing of the constitution; and the
earliest interpretation of the provision by the legislature as manifested in the first law
passed following adoption.”74
As to plain meaning, the court compared the broad language of the opening
sentence with the “detailed list of privileges and protections” in the following
sentences,75 concluding that the differences suggested the first sentence was merely a
“general guide.”76 Next, as to constitutional debates, the court noted that the
legislature had removed the language on fairness, dignity and respect “from the list
of enumerated rights.”77 With regard to existing practices, the court observed that
the two-part structure of a preexisting statute, with a broad opening statement
followed by specifically enumerated rights, was followed in the constitution.78 The
court concluded that the reason for constitutionalizing already existing statutory

69
Id. at 321. See also N.J. CONST. art. I, § 22 (“A victim of crime shall not be denied the
right to be present at public judicial proceedings except when, prior to completing testimony
as a witness, the victim is properly sequestered in accordance with law . . . .”).
70

Id. at 322.

71

Id. at 328.

72

Schilling v. Wisconsin, 692 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Wis. 2005) (examining WIS. CONST. art.
I, § 9m).
73

Id.

74

Id. at 627.

75

Id. at 628.

76

Id.

77

Id. at 629.

78

Id.
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rights was to ensure the rights permanently.79 Thus, the constitutional provision
“was adopted to give weight to” the crime victim statute, but not to change it.80
Finally, the Wisconsin court considered the “first significant law passed”
following the constitutional amendment.81 While this law created a new section of
specifically enumerated rights, it placed fairness and dignity concerns in another
section called “Legislative intent,”82 suggesting the two sections were to be handled
differently by the courts. Only the section on enumerated rights delegated to the
judiciary the power to create remedies.83 The court concluded there was no
“enforceable, self-executing right” regarding “fairness, dignity and respect.”84
Regarding crime victim recoveries, the Wisconsin Constitution says that the
“state shall ensure that crime victims have all the following privileges and
protections as provided by law,” including “restitution” and “compensation.”85
Notwithstanding this mandate for legislative assurance, constitutional crime victim
recovery rights in Wisconsin may nevertheless depend on the precise statutory
language.
4. Nebraska
The Nebraska Supreme Court similarly held that its constitutional provision
recognizing that a crime victim has the “right to be informed of, be present at, and
make an oral or written statement at sentencing, parole, pardon, commutation, and
conditional release proceedings” was not self-executing.86 Thus, a crime victim was
denied the right to be heard at a Board of Pardons commutation proceeding.87 The
Nebraska decision differed from the Wisconsin ruling in that the Nebraska “right”
(to make a statement) was more individual or personal than the Wisconsin
admonition on state responsibility (to treat with fairness). However, the Nebraska
court also focused on the role of the legislature, noting the constitutional declaration
that the “Legislature shall provide by law for the implementation of the rights
granted in this section” and that there “shall be no remedies other than as specifically
provided by the Legislature for the enforcement of the rights granted.”88 The court
rejected the argument that a statute generally providing for civil liability for anyone
who “causes . . . any citizen . . . the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by . . . the
79

Id. at 631.

80

Id.

81

Id.

82

Id.

83

Id. (providing that remedies are required constitutionally “only for violations of the
‘privileges and protections’ enumerated in the second sentence of Article I, Section 9m of the
Wisconsin Constitution”).
84
85

Id. at 632.
WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m.

86

State ex rel. Lamm v. Nebraska Bd. of Pardons, 620 N.W.2d 763, 768-69 (Neb. 2001)
(citing NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28).
87

Id. at 763.

88

Id. at 768-69.
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Constitution . . . of the State of Nebraska” afforded the crime victim a right to a
remedy for violation of the statement right.89 The court succinctly concluded:
A constitutional provision is not self-executing if such provision merely
indicates a line of policy or principles without supplying the means by
which such policy or principles are to be carried into effect, if the
language of the constitutional provision is directed to the Legislature, or if
the language of a constitutional provision indicates that subsequent
legislation is contemplated or necessary for effectuation of such
provision.90
In Nebraska, a crime victim has a constitutional right “to be informed of all
criminal court proceedings.”91
This alone seems inadequate to support a
constitutionally-based crime victim recovery right unattached to statute.
5. California
A similar result was reached in California where a crime victim had not been
notified of a sentencing hearing even though he had a statutory right to notice of and
“to attend all sentencing proceedings.”92 The victim argued that a resulting
probation order should be set aside, relying, in part, upon Article I, Section 28 of the
California Constitution, which includes “a bill of rights for victims of crime” that
encompasses not only the right to restitution, but also “the more basic expectation
that persons who commit felonious acts causing injury to innocent victims will be
appropriately detained . . . and sufficiently punished.”93 The court found that the
constitutional and statutory language was “directory, as distinguished from
mandatory.”94 It observed there were “[n]o procedures to enforce the duty of
89

Id.

90

Id. at 769. A Nebraska Attorney General Opinion reviewed Nebraska case law, finding
the constitutional assurances as to “free instruction in the common schools” are not selfexecuting. Student Fees and the Right to Free Instruction in Public Schools, No. 02004 Op.
Neb. Att’y Gen. (2002).
91

NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28 (“(1) A victim of a crime, as shall be defined by law, or his or
her guardian or representative shall have: The right to be informed of all criminal court
proceedings; the right to be present at trial unless the trial court finds sequestration necessary
for a fair trial for the defendant; and the right to be informed of, be present at, and make an
oral or written statement at sentencing, parole, pardon, commutation, and conditional release
proceedings. This enumeration of certain rights for crime victims shall not be construed to
impair or deny others provided by law or retained by crime victims. (2) The Legislature shall
provide by law for the implementation of the rights granted in this section. There shall be no
remedies other than as specifically provided by the Legislature for the enforcement of the
rights granted by this section. (3) Nothing in this section shall constitute a basis for error in
favor of a defendant in any criminal proceeding, a basis for providing standing to participate
as party to any criminal proceeding, or a basis to contest the disposition of any charge.”).
92
People v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 154 Cal. App. 3d 319, 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 119.1 (West 2010) wherein the responsibility for notice is given to
the probation officer).
93

Id. at 322.

94

Id. at 321-22.
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notification or remedies for the failure to do so.”95 Therefore, the court denied the
victim’s petition, concluding that it had “no authority to afford any relief.”96
The constitutional restitution right in California is similar to the notice right. A
victim is entitled to restitution97 but there are “no procedures to enforce” remedies.98
Thus, California is unlikely to support crime victim recovery without a statute.
6. Arizona
A victim in Arizona was similarly left without relief when the Arizona Supreme
Court refused to extend the right to be heard to a victim who wished to file litigation
papers apart from the state.99 The case involved a criminal defendant’s petition for
postconviction relief.100 In order to have her own right to file, the court said that the
victim would need to be an aggrieved party.101 The court held that having the right
to be heard did not make the victim an aggrieved party.102
In coming to its conclusion, the Arizona court first looked to the constitutional
language. One provision grants crime victims the right “[t]o be heard at any
proceeding involving a post-arrest release decision . . . [and] to be heard at any
proceeding when any post-conviction release from confinement is being
considered.”103 The court decided that the victim could not use the first part of this
provision to support a right to file her own papers because it refers to “release” not
“relief.”104 Since the proceeding concerned the defendant’s petition for postconviction relief105 and not post-conviction release, the court held the constitutional
provision was inapplicable.106
The court also rejected the victim’s argument that the second part, the right to be
heard on matters of release, “includes the right to file her own separate petition.”107
It reasoned that the right to be heard was not “clearly” defined, noting the enabling
statute did not mention any right to file a separate petition.108 The statute only said
95

Id. at 322.

96

Id. But see Melissa J. v. Superior Court of Alameda Cnty., 190 Cal. App. 3d 476 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1987) (finding relief can be afforded a victim whose monthly restitution was halted
by a court without notice of the hearing to the victim).
97

CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28 (“victim shall be entitled to . . . restitution”).

98

Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 154 Cal. App. 3d at 322.

99

Arizona v. Lamberton, 899 P.2d 939 (Ariz. 1995).

100

Id. at 940.

101

Id. (citing ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.9).

102

Id. at 941.

103

Id. (citing ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A)).

104

Id. at 942.

105

Id. at 940 (based on cruel and unusual punishment).

106

Id.

107

Id.

108

Id.
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that the victim had a “right to be notified of post-conviction review and appellate
proceedings.”109
Finally, the Arizona court found there was a way for the victim to be heard
without filing a separate petition; it observed that the victim could be heard on
appeal via the trial court record and that the state often voices victim interests in
postconviction relief papers.110 The high court affirmed the dismissal of the victim’s
separate petition.111
In Arizona, crime victim recovery in a criminal case may need to depend upon
state cooperation. The constitution only says that responsibility for crime victim
restitution is in the “legislature, or the people by initiative or referendum.”112 Yet,
unlike in postconviction relief settings, the state in restitution settings may be less
likely to voice victim interests. This may be so because, as will be discussed later,
restitution to the victim can interfere with forfeitures to the state.
The above examples of varied state enforcement of crime victim rights illustrate
that even where American state constitutions speak to crime victims recoveries, they
typically would not secure significant enforceable rights in the absence of
legislation. It appears that legislation is more obligatory in states with constitutions
directly alluding to such recoveries. But ultimately, legislative discretion generally
reigns. We next examine statutes on crime victim recoveries in states with and
without constitutional provisions.
III. STATUTORY APPROACHES TO CRIME VICTIM RECOVERIES
A. Introduction
While several American state constitutions expressly recognize crime victim
recoveries, such recoveries are typically limited by dependence on enabling
legislation as well as by narrow definitions of relevant crimes and victims. For
example, the stated purpose of the New Mexico Victims of Crime Statute is “to
assure that . . . the provisions of Article 2, Section 24 of the constitution of New
Mexico are implemented.”113 By contrast, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin declared
that its constitutional amendment on crime victims “was adopted to give weight to”
preexisting statutory crime victim rights.114 However, because legislative schemes
for crime victim recoveries have been generally implemented, explicit constitutional
foundations are unnecessary. Quite strong statutory crime victim recovery rights
appear in several states with no express constitutional provisions. For example,

109

Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4411 (West 2010)).

110

Id. at 942.

111

Id. at 942-43.

112

ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(D) (“The legislature, or the people by initiative or
referendum, have the authority to enact substantive and procedural laws to define, implement,
preserve and protect the rights guaranteed to victims by this section, including the authority to
extend any of these rights to juvenile proceedings.”).
113
114

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-26-2(D) (West 2010).
Schilling, 692 N.W.2d at 631.
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Indiana allows a victim standing115 to enforce the statutory right to pursue
restitution.116 Some states mandate that government officials advise crime victims of
available recovery schemes.117 Pennsylvania allows for the preservation of a
criminal defendant’s assets in anticipation of a criminal case order involving victim
restitution.118
Whether or not constitutional provisions are in play, there are three major
avenues to crime victim recoveries. These are recoveries on civil claims, including
in civil cases; recoveries from government through administrative or special court
proceedings; and recoveries during criminal investigations or cases.119
Constitutional120 and statutory121 provisions often recognize that crime victims
can themselves pursue recoveries from convicted or alleged criminals, or from the
criminally accused, in civil cases.122 Such provisions recognize private interests
rather than the public interests that are normally associated with criminal case
sentencing.
115
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-40-2-1 (West 2010) (“A victim has standing to assert the rights
established by this article.”). In the federal courts, limited crime victim standing to enforce
statutory rights has been criticized. See Improving Restitution in Federal Criminal Cases:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 7-10
(2008) (statement of Paul G. Cassell, Professor) [hereinafter Cassell Testimony].
116

IND. CODE ANN. § 35-40-5-7 (“A victim has the right to pursue an order of restitution
and other civil remedies against the person convicted of a crime against the victim.”).
117
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.0021 (West 2010) (while there is no constitutional right to
seek restitution in the Florida Constitution, “victims must be properly advised in the courts” of
“the right . . . [t]o seek crimes compensation and restitution.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.02
(West 2010) (a peace officer must notify a victim of the rights of crime victims “to apply for
reparations to cover losses . . . resulting from a violent crime and the . . . right to request
restitution.”).
118

42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9728(e) (West 2010).

119

Far less legislation addresses crime victim recoveries in anticipation of possible later
civil cases or during criminal investigations that precede any formal charges.
120
See ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1 (“[A] victim of crime has a right . . . [t]o be present . . .
[t]o confer with the prosecution [and] [t]o receive prompt restitution.”); CONN. CONST. art. I, §
8(b) (West 2010) (“In all criminal prosecutions, a victim . . . shall have . . . the right to
communicate with the prosecution . . . the right to restitution which shall be enforceable in the
same manner as any other cause of action or as otherwise provided by law . . . .”); OKLA.
CONST. art. II, § 34(A) (West 2010) (“[A] victim of crime has the right . . . to be awarded
restitution by the convicted person for damages or losses as determined and ordered by the
court . . . .”).
121
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.0021 (“[I]n order to ensure that crime victims can
effectively understand and exercise their rights . . . victims must be properly advised . . . . The
courts may fulfill their obligation to advise crime victims by . . . [m]aking the following
announcement . . . ‘[i]f you are the victim of a crime with a case pending before this court,
you are advised that you have the right . . . [t]o seek crimes compensation and restitution.’”).
122

So even where there has not been, and will not be, a criminal case (and thus no one
convicted or criminally accused), a victim harmed by the commission of a crime can pursue
the alleged wrongdoer in a civil case. When there is a criminal case, a crime victim may be
able to pursue recovery from the criminally accused, or might have to wait until conviction.
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Civil case recovery rights at times anticipate the use of a criminal case
resolution.123 State statutory as well as constitutional provisions promote a crime
victim’s recovery in a later civil case by recognizing the right of the victim to be
heard during the criminal case,124 thereby possibly securing an established record of
injuries. Such provisions can also recognize a right to confer with the prosecution.125
Similar rights have been statutorily recognized in the federal courts.126
Crime victim recoveries in administrative or special court proceedings involving
state funds also recognize private interests. Awards occur outside criminal cases.
Like civil cases, these awards can employ earlier criminal case outcomes.127
Crime victim recoveries may also be ordered during criminal case sentencing.
Only under some state statutes are such recoveries deemed restitution.128 At
123
See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-28-5(a) (West 2010) (“Upon . . . final conviction of a
felony after a trial by jury, a civil judgment shall automatically be entered . . . conclusively
establishing . . . liability to the victim for any personal injury and/or loss . . . .”); id. § 12-285.1 (“When the court orders a defendant to make financial restitution to the victim of a crime
of which the defendant had been convicted or to which the defendant has pleaded guilty or
nolo contendere, a civil judgment shall automatically be entered . . . against the defendant on
behalf of the victim for that amount.”).
124

See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-A (West 2010) (“That in criminal proceedings, the
victim shall be accorded fairness, dignity and respect . . . and, as the General Assembly may
define and provide by law, may be accorded rights to reasonable and appropriate notice,
information, restitution, protection, and access to a meaningful role in the criminal justice
process. These rights may include . . . [t]he right to address the circuit court at the time
sentence is imposed . . . [t]he right to restitution [and] the right to confer with the
prosecution.”).
125
The right to confer with prosecution is the first named right in the victims’ rights section
of the Tennessee Constitution. TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35 (“To preserve and protect the rights
of victims of crime to justice and due process, victims shall be entitled to the following basic
rights . . . [t]he right to confer with the prosecution.”).
126
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a) (West 2010) (“A crime victim has the following rights
. . . [t]he right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving
release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding . . . [t]he reasonable right to confer with the
attorney for the Government in the case.”).
127
See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-15-6(b) (West 2010) (“Claims must be investigated . . .
regardless of whether alleged criminal has been apprehended, prosecuted, or convicted . . . .”);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-1018 (West 2010) (“The commission shall award compensation
benefits . . . if satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence . . . . Proof of conviction . . . is
conclusive evidence that the crime was committed . . . .”).
128

But see HAW. REV. STAT. § 801D-4(d) (West 2010) (“Notwithstanding any law to the
contrary, payment of restitution and judgments to victims, or surviving immediate family
members of a victim, shall be a precondition for release on parole for any imprisoned person
whom the Hawaii paroling authority determines has the financial ability to make complete or
partial restitution payments or complete or partial judgment payments to the victim of the
person’s crime, or to the surviving immediate family members of a victim.”); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-40-5-7 (West 2010) (“A victim has the right to pursue an order of restitution and other
civil remedies against the person convicted of a crime against the victim.”); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 915.100 (West 2010) (“Victims . . . have the right to recover pecuniary damages,” with
monetary remedies at sentencing; “[t]he right to restitution includes . . . [i]n all criminal cases
in which there is a plea of guilty, verdict of guilty, or special verdict upon which a judgment
of conviction is rendered, the sentencing court shall order that restitution be made by each
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sentencing, crime victim recoveries secured from criminals chiefly satisfy public
rather than private interests,129 as they promote punishment130 or rehabilitation131
rather than compensation. Because they are not meant to be fully compensatory,
limited or no recoveries at sentencing generally cannot be challenged by crime
victims.132 Furthermore, sentencing recovery orders usually cannot be “open-ended”
deferrals and thus cannot be imposed without consideration of a criminal’s ability to
pay,133 which is quite different from the guidelines on recoveries in civil cases.
B. Terminology
One significant challenge in exploring the three avenues to crime victim recovery
is terminology. The same term, such as “restitution,” may be employed when
speaking of the victim’s independent right to seek recovery in a civil court, the

offender to victims of the offender’s criminal activities.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.200(5)
(West 2010) (“The court in which the conviction is had . . . may order restitution or give
judgment . . . for reparation in damages . . . .”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-201 (2009) (“[T]he
sentencing judge shall . . . require . . . full restitution to the victim . . . .”).
129

FRANK CARRINGTON & JAMES A. RAPP, VICTIMS’ RIGHTS: LAW AND LITIGATION §
3.02[1] (1991) (“Orders of restitution . . . are primarily intended to serve the penal goals of the
state: they are ‘sanctions’ imposed by the criminal justice system.”). See also Matthew
Dickman, Comment, Should Crime Pay?: A Critical Assessment of the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act of 1996, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1687, 1701 (2009) (citing Burt Galaway, Toward
the Rational Development of Restitution, in RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 77, 82 (Joe
Hudson & Burt Galaway eds., 1977)).
130
See Rudd v. Florida, 543 So. 2d 819 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (trial court’s second
restitution order imposed on the criminal defendant without the introduction of new evidence
violated double jeopardy protections; “[r]estitution orders which are part of the sentence of
community control are criminal in nature”); Iowa v. Mayberry, 415 N.W.2d 644, 646-47
(Iowa 1987) (whether a restitution order at sentencing was “a fine, a civil claim, or a hybrid is
not entirely clear,” but an order of restitution at sentencing is a fine for the purposes of the
criminal defendant’s Eighth Amendment claim; the restitution order here was not excessive as
it was reasonably related to the relevant damages).
131

See ALA. CODE § 15-18-68(a) (West 2010) (“In determining the manner, method, or
amount of restitution to be ordered, the court may take into consideration . . . [t]he anticipated
rehabilitative effect on the defendant regarding the manner of restitution or the method of
payment.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-37-3(2) (West 2010) (“In determining whether to order
restitution which may be complete, partial or nominal, the court shall taken into account . . .
[t]he rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the method of
payment.”).
132
See State v. Leingang, 763 N.W.2d 769, 773-74 (N.D. 2009) (after reviewing both
federal and state cases, the court held that a victim could not challenge an order allowing a
guilty plea withdrawal, though the guilty plea included an unpaid restitution order); See also
United States v. Rich, 603 F.3d 722, 730 (9th Cir. 2010) (abatement of criminal conviction
due to defendant’s death while conviction was on appeal nullified the accompanying
restitution order as it was “penal” as well as “compensatory”).
133
But see E.J. v. State, 1 So. 3d 251, 252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (recognizing deferral
orders tied to “certain specific events” occurring in the future can be made during criminal
case sentencing).
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victim’s right to recover from a government fund, and the victim’s ability to recover
at a sentencing.134
Further, the term “restitution” is used in both constitutions and statutes. These
two legal sources in a single state may not even be related. In Arizona135 and
Oklahoma,136 for example, a victim has the constitutional right to receive restitution
from a person who has been convicted of a crime causing the victim’s injury in a
context suggesting restitution involves recovery at sentencing.137 However, by
statute a criminal court judge in Arizona must advise a crime victim that “[he or she
has] rights . . . to receive restitution from a person who is convicted of causing [his
or her] loss.”138 The statutory right to restitution appears to encompass recoveries
outside of a sentencing order. In Texas139 and Michigan,140 there is merely a
constitutional “right to restitution,” with varying implementing statutes that, at times,
mention both restitution and compensation.141 Florida, whose constitution has no
134

See CARRINGTON & RAPP, supra note 129, § 3.02[3] n.17. Of course, there are other
challenges with the term restitution. It has meaning, and prompts some confusion, in settings
unrelated to crime victim recoveries. See, e.g., Swain v. Cach, LLC, 699 F. Supp. 2d 1109,
1115-16 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“At issue is whether Plaintiff may assert an independent cause of
action for unjust enrichment. Under California law, ‘[u]njust enrichment is not a cause of
action . . . or even a remedy, but rather a general principle, underlying various legal doctrines
and remedies. It is synonymous with restitution.’ . . . Thus, unjust enrichment is a theory of
recovery, not an independent legal claim.”).
135

ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A) (“[A] victim of crime has a right: (1) To be treated with
fairness . . . throughout the criminal justice process . . . (8) To receive prompt restitution from
the person or persons convicted of the criminal conduct that caused the victim’s loss or
injury.”).
136

OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34(A) (“To . . . ensure that victims are treated with fairness . . .
throughout the criminal justice process . . . [t]he victim . . . has the right . . . to be awarded
restitution by the convicted person for damages or losses as determined and ordered by the
court . . . .”).
137
By contrast, the Missouri Constitution provides for “[t]he right to restitution, which
shall be enforceable in the same manner as any other civil cause of action, or as otherwise
provided by law . . . .” MO. CONST. art. I, § 32.
138

Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4438 (2010), with id. § 13-603 (“If a person is
convicted of an offense, the court shall require the convicted person to make restitution to the
person who is the victim of the crime . . . .”). The Restitution chapter of Arizona’s Criminal
Code details the range of monetary remedies that can be ordered by the court. See id. §§ 13801 to 13-806.
139
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(a) (“A crime victim has the following rights: (1) . . . to be
treated with fairness . . . throughout the criminal justice process . . . (4) the right to
restitution . . . .”).
140

MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24(1) (“Crime victims . . . have . . . [t]he right to restitution.”).

141

The Texas Constitution says legislators “may enact laws to define the term victim and
to enforce” the constitutional rights of crime victims. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(c). In the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, under the heading Proceedings After Verdict, in the
chapter regarding Judgment and Sentence:
[T]he court that sentences a defendant convicted of an offense may order the
defendant to make restitution to any victim of the offense . . . . If the court does
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explicit recognition of crime victim restitution, provides by statute for crime victim
rights to both “restitution” and “compensation.”142 Monetary recoveries at
sentencing governed solely by statutes are often, but not always, deemed
“restitution.”143
At least one state constitution explicitly provides many details on the
“compensation” of crime victims through government funds.144 Other states that
have constitutional145 or statutory146 rights to victim-initiated monetary recoveries
also have statutory schemes in place or crime victim recoveries from the state.147 At
times, a recovery from such a fund is deemed “restitution.”148
In the federal courts, the term “restitution” encompasses both a victim’s right to
recover at sentencing149 and an award against a criminal benefiting the federal
government in order to support victim assistance and substance abuse programs.150
not order restitution or orders partial restitution . . . the court shall state . . . the
reasons for not making the order or for the limited order.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.037 (West 2010). In the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure, under the heading Miscellaneous Proceedings, the chapter regarding Crime
Victims’ Rights, “[a] victim . . . is entitled to . . . the right to be informed, when requested . . .
concerning . . . restitution . . . [and] the right to receive information regarding compensation to
victims of crime . . . .” Id. art. 56.02.
By contrast, in the Michigan Constitution crime victims are defined by law, and their
rights, including restitution, are “as provided by law” and rights enforcement “may” be
provided for statutorily. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24.
142
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.0021 (West 2010) (“victims must be properly advised . . . [of the
right] [t]o seek crimes compensation and restitution”).
143

Compare, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-101 (West 2010) (“‘Restitution’ means full or
partial payment of pecuniary damage to a victim”), with ALA. CODE § 15-18-66 (West 2010)
(“Full, partial or nominal payment of pecuniary damages to the victim or to its equivalent in
services performed or work or labor done for the benefit of the victim as determined by the
court of record.”). See also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-111 (expressly recognizing a victim’s
right to civil action if the victim is not satisfied with the criminal court’s restitution plan).
144
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 31 (“The compensation to victims of crime fund . . . and the
compensation to victims of crime auxiliary fund . . . are each a separated dedicated
account . . . [which] may be expended as provided by law only for delivering or funding
victim-related compensation, services, or assistance.”).
145

See, e.g., OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34 (“[A]ny victim or family member of a victim of a
crime has the right . . . to be awarded restitution by the convicted person for damages or losses
as determined and ordered by the court . . . .”).
146
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.0021 (West 2010) (“[V]ictims must be properly advised . . . [of
the right] [t]o seek crimes compensation and restitution.”).
147

See id. §§ 960.01-.28; 21 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 142.1-.20 (West 2010); TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.31-.64 (West 2010).
148

Compare, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.0021 (“[V]ictims must be properly advised . . .
[of the right] [t]o seek crimes compensation and restitution.”), with MINN. STAT. ANN. §
611A.51-611A.68 (West 2010) (administrative compensation awards through state supported
funds is referred to as “victim reparation”).
149
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771 (West 2010) (“A crime victim has the following rights . . . [t]he
right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving release,
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Beside restitution, there are other challenging terms when examining crime
victim recoveries. Who qualifies as a “crime victim” entitled to recovery often
differs in a single state depending upon context. For example, the New Mexico
Constitution expressly defines a crime victim who has both procedural and
substantive rights in criminal cases as:
A victim of arson resulting in bodily injury, aggravated arson, aggravated
assault, aggravated battery, dangerous use of explosives, negligent use of
a deadly weapon, murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary
manslaughter, kidnapping, criminal sexual penetration, criminal sexual
contact of a minor, homicide by vehicle, great bodily injury by vehicle or
abandonment or abuse of a child or that victim’s representative.151
However, a New Mexico statute on crime victims, which implements these
rights, is broader by including as a victim “an individual against whom a criminal
offense is committed” and some family members of crime victims.152 Furthermore,
plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding . . . [t]he reasonable right to confer with the
attorney for the Government in the case . . . [t]he right to full and timely restitution as
provided in law); id. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (“The court, when sentencing a defendant . . . may order,
in addition to or, in the case of a misdemeanor, in lieu of any other penalty authorized by law,
that the defendant make restitution to any victim of such offense . . . .”); id. § 3663A
(“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, when sentencing a defendant convicted . . . the
court shall order, in addition to, or in the case of a misdemeanor, in addition to or in lieu of,
any other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the
offense . . . .”).
150
See id. § 3663(c)(1) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . in which there is
no identifiable victim, the court may order that the defendant make restitution . . . .”); id. §
3663(c)(2)(A) (“An order of restitution under this subsection shall be based on the amount of
public harm caused by the offense . . . .”); id. § 3663(c)(2)(B) (“In no case shall the amount of
restitution ordered under this subsection exceed the amount of the fine which may be ordered
for the offense charged in the case.”); id. § 3663(c)(3) (“Restitution under this subsection shall
be distributed as follows: (A) 65 percent of the total amount of restitution shall be paid to the
State entity designated to administer crime victim assistance in the State in which the crime
occurred. (B) 35 percent of the total amount of restitution shall be paid to the State entity
designated to receive Federal substance abuse block grant funds.”).
151

N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24(A). It is expressly stated in the crime victim rights section of
the New Mexico Constitution that the noted crime victim rights do not take effect until the
legislature enacts statutes. Id. art. II, § 24(C) (“The provisions of this amendment shall not
take effect until the legislature enacts laws to implement this amendment.”).
152
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-26-3(F) (West 2010) (“As used in the Victims of Crime Act . . .
‘victim’ means an individual against whom a criminal offense is committed. ‘Victim’ also
means a family member or a victim’s representative when the individual against whom a
criminal offense was committed is a minor, is incompetent or is a homicide victim . . .
‘criminal offense’ means . . . negligent arson resulting in death or bodily injury . . . aggravated
arson . . . aggravated assault . . . aggravated battery . . . dangerous use of explosives . . .
negligent use of a deadly weapon . . . murder . . . voluntary manslaughter . . . involuntary
manslaughter . . . kidnapping . . . criminal sexual penetration . . . criminal sexual contact of a
minor . . . armed robbery . . . homicide by vehicle . . . great bodily injury by vehicle . . .
abandonment or abuse of a child . . . stalking or aggravated stalking . . . aggravated assault
against a household member . . . assault against a household member with intent to commit a
violent felony . . . battery against a household member . . . aggravated battery against a
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the New Mexico statute on crime victim recoveries at sentencing defines a victim as
“any person who has suffered actual damages as a result of the defendant’s criminal
activities.”153
Another example of the conflicting terminology within one state is Texas, where
a crime victim recovery at a sentencing is seemingly narrower (no property claims)
than crime victim recovery from a state fund (property claims).154
Who qualifies as a crime victim also differs among states. Some state statutes
allow varying kinds of family members of criminal code victims to themselves be
victims in criminal case recovery settings, while others do not.155
household member”). See also id. § 31-26-2 (“Recognizing the state’s concern for victims of
crime, it is the purpose of the Victims of Crime Act to assure that: A. the full impact of a
crime is brought to the attention of a court; B. victims of violent crimes are treated with
dignity, respect and sensitivity at all stages of the criminal justice process; C. victims’ rights
are protected by law enforcement agencies, prosecutors and judges as vigorously as are the
rights of criminal defendants; and D. the provisions of Article 2, Section 24 of the
Constitution of New Mexico are implemented in statute.”); id. § 31-26-6 (“The rights and
duties established pursuant to the provisions of the Victims of Crime Act take effect when an
individual is formally charged by a district attorney for allegedly committing a criminal
offense against a victim. Those rights and duties remain in effect until final disposition of the
court proceedings attendant to the charged criminal offense.”).
153
Id. § 31-17-1(A)(1). “Criminal activities” are also broader in statute than in the
constitution. See id. § 31-17-1(A)(3) (“‘[C]riminal activities’ includes any crime for which
there is a plea of guilty or verdict of guilty, upon which a judgment may be rendered and any
other crime committed after July 1, 1977 which is admitted or not contested by the
defendant . . . .”).

Sometimes states with narrow constitutional definitions also have similarly narrow
statutory definitions. See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art. I, § 22 (“‘victim of a crime’ means: a) a
person who has suffered physical or psychological injury or has incurred loss of or damage to
personal or real property as a result of a crime or an incident involving another person
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and b) the spouse,
parent, legal guardian, grandparent, child or sibling of the decedent in the case of a criminal
homicide.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-37 (West 2010) (“As used in this act, ‘victim’ means a
person who suffers personal, physical or psychological injury or death or incurs loss of or
injury to personal or real property as a result of a crime committed by an adult or an act of
delinquency that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, committed against that
person. ‘Victim’ also includes the nearest relative of the victim of a criminal homicide.”).
154

Compare TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.01(3) (West 2010) (“‘Victim’ means a
person who is the victim of the offense of sexual assault, kidnapping, aggravated robbery,
trafficking of persons, or injury to a child, elderly individual, or disabled individual or who
has suffered personal injury or death as a result of the criminal conduct of another.”), and
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.037(a) (West 2010) (“In addition to any fine authorized
by law, the court that sentences a defendant convicted of an offense may order the defendant
to make restitution to any victim of the offense”), with TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
42.037(b) (West 2010) (“If the offense results in damage to or loss or destruction of property
of a victim of the offense, the court may order the defendant: (A) to return the property to the
owner of the property or someone designated by the owner; or (B) if return of the property is
impossible or impractical or is an inadequate remedy, to pay an amount equal to the greater of
(i) the value of the property on the date of the damage, loss, or destruction; or (ii) the value of
the property on the date of sentencing, less the value of any part of the property that is
returned on the date the property is returned.”).
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There are further interstate differences between crime victims within a single
recovery setting. Consider crime victim recoveries from state funds. In Florida,
“victim” in a state fund setting encompasses not just the person harmed most directly
by an offender’s actions, but also a child who observed the crime and suffered
resulting emotional or psychological stress.156 Elsewhere, crime victim recoveries
from state funds are limited to specific victims.157 In Texas, a crime victim entitled
to a state-funded recovery need not be harmed in Texas and need not be a resident of
Texas.158 Even a Texas resident who suffers harm outside of the United States can
155

Compare, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4401(19) (West 2010) (“‘Victim’ means a
person against whom the criminal offense has been committed, including a minor, or if the
person is killed or incapacitated, the person’s spouse, parent, child, grandparent or sibling ”),
and id. § 13-4438 (“a judge of the superior court shall make the following statement: If you
are the victim of a crime with a case pending before this court, you are advised that you have
rights . . . to receive restitution from a person who is convicted of causing your loss”), with id.
§ 13-804(A) (“Upon a defendant’s conviction for an offense causing economic loss to any
person, the court, in its sole discretion, may order that all or any portion of the fine imposed be
allocated as restitution to be paid by the defendant to any person who suffered an economic
loss caused by the defendant's conduct.”).
156
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.03(14) (West 2010) (“Victim means: (a) A person who suffers
personal physical injury or death as a direct result of a crime; (b) A person younger than 18
years of age who was present at the scene of a crime, saw or heard the crime, and suffered a
psychiatric or psychological injury because of the crime, but who was not physically injured;
or (c) A person against whom a forcible felony was committed and who suffers a psychiatric
or psychological injury as a direct result of that crime but who does not otherwise sustain a
personal physical injury or death.”).
157

For example, in New Mexico the state funded scheme narrowly defines a victim under
the same crime-specific categories found in the criminal code provisions and the constitution.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22-3(I) (West 2010) (“As used in the Crime Victims Reparation
Act . . . ‘victim’ means: (1) a person in New Mexico who is injured or killed by any act or
omission of any other person that is a crime enumerated in [N.M. Stat. § 31-22-8]; (2) a
resident of New Mexico who is injured or killed by such a crime occurring in a state other
than New Mexico if that state does not have an eligible crime victims compensation program;
or (3) a resident of New Mexico who is injured or killed by an act of international
terrorism . . . .”); id. § 31-22-8 (“The crimes to which the Crime Victims Reparation Act
applies and for which reparation to victims may be made are the following enumerated
offenses and all other offenses in which any enumerated offense is necessarily included: (1)
arson resulting in bodily injury; (2) aggravated arson; (3) aggravated assault or aggravated
battery; (4) dangerous use of explosives; (5) negligent use of a deadly weapon; (6) murder; (7)
voluntary manslaughter; (8) involuntary manslaughter; (9) kidnapping; (10) criminal sexual
penetration; (11) criminal sexual contact of a minor; (12) homicide by vehicle or great bodily
injury by vehicle . . . (13) abandonment or abuse of a child; (14) aggravated indecent exposure
[and] (15) aggravated stalking”).
158
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.32(11) (West 2010) (“‘Victim’ means . . . (A) an
individual who: (i) suffers personal injury or death as a result of criminally injurious conduct
or as a result of actions taken by the individual as an intervener, if the conduct or actions
occurred in this state; and (ii) is a resident of this state, another state of the United States, the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a possession or territory of the
United States; (B) an individual who: (i) suffers personal injury or death as a result of
criminally injurious conduct or as a result of actions taken by the individual as an intervener,
if the conduct or actions occurred in a state or country that does not have a crime victims’
compensation program . . . (ii) is a resident of this state; and (iii) would be entitled to
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be a victim for state funded recovery purposes,159 as can a person who acts on behalf
of a victim or who pays for a victim’s losses.160
With an understanding of the possible mix of constitutional and statutory
provisions as well as the challenges posed by inconsistent terminology, we now
explore more fully crime victim recoveries in civil claims, agency or special court
proceedings involving state funds, and criminal cases.
C. Civil Claim Recoveries
All American states provide opportunities for some crime victims to
independently pursue recovery in civil cases from the criminally alleged, accused, or
convicted. In such cases, the judicial and/or prosecutorial cooperation, often
necessary for recoveries during criminal case sentencing, is unnecessary. Recoveries
are available for crime victims independent of any criminal prosecution, case, or
sentence.161 However, state funds are not available to them in such civil cases.
A victim’s claim against a criminal typically arises under common law tort.162
State legislatures occasionally impose duties on specially created offices,
prosecutors, or peace officers to assist victims with such civil cases.163 Civil claim
compensation under this subchapter if the criminally injurious conduct or actions had occurred
in this state . . . .”).
159

Id. (“‘Victim’ means . . . (C) an individual who: (i) suffers personal injury or death as a
result of criminally injurious conduct caused by an act of international terrorism . . .
committed outside of the United States; and (ii) is a resident of this state.”). See also KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 346.025 (West 2010) (“‘Victim’ shall also include nonresidents of this
state who suffer losses as a direct result of criminal acts occurring within this state.”).
160
TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 56.32(2) (“‘Claimant’ means, except as provided by
Subsection (b), any of the following individuals who is entitled to file or has filed a claim for
compensation under this subchapter: (A) an authorized individual acting on behalf of a victim;
(B) an individual who legally assumes the obligation or who voluntarily pays medical or
burial expenses of a victim incurred as a result of the criminally injurious conduct of another;
(C) a dependent of a victim who died as a result of criminally injurious conduct; (D) an
immediate family member or household member of a victim who: (i) requires psychiatric care
or counseling as a result of the criminally injurious conduct; or (ii) as a result of the criminally
injurious conduct, incurs with respect to a deceased victim expenses for traveling to and
attending the victim’s funeral or suffers wage loss from bereavement leave taken in
connection with the death of that victim; or (E) an authorized individual acting on behalf of an
individual who is described by Subdivision (C) or (D) and who is a child.”).
161

See, e.g., CARRINGTON & RAPP, supra note 129, § 5.01[1][a] (based on 21A AM. JUR. 2D
Criminal Law § 1028 (1981), the “[c]ommitment of the perpetrator to prison affords no
immunity against suit, service of civil process, or enforcement of a judgment”).
162
See, e.g., id. (“Theories of recovery are usually obvious and well recognized, including
assault, battery, false imprisonment and infliction of emotional distress.”).
163

See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-302.5(1)(i) (West 2010) (“[E]ach victim of a
crime shall have the following rights . . . [t]he right to be informed of the victim’s right to
pursue a civil judgment against any person convicted of a crime against the victim . . . as a
result of the commission of the crime regardless of whether the court has ordered such person
to make restitution to the victim . . . .”); id. § 24-4.1-303(1) (“Law enforcement agencies,
prosecutorial agencies, judicial agencies and correctional agencies shall ensure that victims of
crimes are afforded the rights described in section 24-4.1-302.5.”).
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recovery may sometimes be labeled as restitution.164 Crime victim recovery rights in
civil cases should have no significant effects on the criminal case procedures.
Civil case recoveries by crime victims are at times referenced in statutes chiefly
dealing with crime victim participation in criminal cases. Other statutes simply
recognize that civil case recovery is available. Thus, some crime victim rights
provisions include the “right” to “restitution,” which could include civil as well as
criminal case recoveries.165 The criminal procedure laws in some states recognize a
right to seek166 or to pursue167 restitution, or a right to restitution “to the extent
possible.”168
D. Administrative and Special Court Recoveries
Crime victim recoveries can also involve state funds. Such recoveries may be
based on constitutional directives. A few state constitutions expressly recognize the
opportunity for state-supported recoveries.169 Other state constitutions authorize the
legislature to enact laws to assist crime victims.170 In Oklahoma, while there is no
164
For example, constitutional crime victim restitution at times seems untied to crime
victim recovery at criminal case sentencing. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30 (“A crime victim has
the following rights . . . the right to restitution . . . .”); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m (“This state
shall ensure that crime victims have all of the following privileges and protections as provided
by law . . . restitution; compensation . . . .”).
165

See IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.13(1)(c) (West 2010) (“[t]he right to restitution for
pecuniary losses”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 120/4(a)(10) (West 2010) (“right to
restitution”).
166

Louisiana statutorily and constitutionally provides a right only to seek restitution. LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1844(M) (West 2010); LA. CONST. art. I, § 25. Yet the same statute
says that “[i]f the defendant is found guilty, the court or parole board shall require the
defendant to pay restitution . . . .” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1844(M)(1).
167

See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-40-5-7 (West 2010).

168

See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11.201(6) (recognizes a right of a crime victim to
“be restored, to the extent possible, to the precrime economic status through the provision of
restitution, compensation and the expeditious return of property”).
169
But see TEX. CONST. art. I, § 31(a)-(b) (“The compensation to victims of crime fund
created by general law and the compensation to victims of crime auxiliary fund created by
general law are each a separate dedicated account in the general revenue fund. . . . [M]oney
deposited to the credit of the compensation to victims of crime fund or the compensation to
victims of crime auxiliary fund from any source may be expended as provided by law only for
delivering or funding victim-related compensation, services, or assistance.”); WIS. CONST. art.
I, § 9m (“This state shall ensure that crime victims have all of the following privileges and
protections as provided by law . . . restitution; compensation . . . .”); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23
(“A victim of crime . . . shall be entitled to receive, from the perpetrator of the crime, financial
compensation for any injury or loss caused by the perpetrator of the crime, and shall receive
such other compensation as the state may provide.”); GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 6(f) (“The
General Assembly shall be authorized to allocate certain funds, to appropriate funds, to
provide for a continuing fund, or to provide for any combination thereof for the purpose of
compensating innocent victims of crime and for the administration of any laws enacted for
such purpose.”).
170
See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(D) (“The legislature, or the people by initiative or
referendum, have the authority to enact substantive and procedural laws to define, implement,
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explicit state constitutional provision for crime victim recovery, a state statute
provides that it is the “intent of the Legislature to provide a method of compensating
and assisting those persons who become victims of criminal acts.”171 In Georgia, the
constitution authorizes the General Assembly to compensate “innocent victims of
crime.”172 In some state schemes, one can seek recovery from state funds though not
an actual victim of a crime as defined in the criminal code. Such claimants
sometimes include family members of crime victims.173
State-funded compensation is sometimes paid with funds derived from criminal
case cost assessments.174 At other times, there are different assessments.175 Federal
preserve and protect the rights guaranteed to victims . . . .”). Such rights, by the text of the
constitution, include the right
To be present at and, upon request, to be informed of all criminal proceedings
where the defendant has the right to be present [and] [t]o confer with the
prosecution, after the crime against the victim has been charged, before trial or
before any disposition of the case and to be informed of the disposition.
Id. art. II, § 2.1(A). See also MO. CONST. art. I, § 32(5) (“The general assembly shall have
power to enforce this section by appropriate legislation.”). Rights provided in the Missouri
Constitution include “[t]he right to be present at all criminal justice proceedings at which the
defendant has such right . . . [t]he right to information about how the criminal justice system
works, the rights and the availability of services, and upon request of the victim the right to
information about the crime.” Id. art. I, § 32(1).
171

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 142.1 (West 2010).

172

GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 6(f).

173

See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 624(1) (McKinney 2010) (surviving family members and
dependents of those murdered as crime victims); ALA. CODE § 15-23-3 (West 2010) (“(3)
VICTIM. A person who suffered serious personal injury or death as a result of criminally
injurious conduct. . . . (4) DEPENDENT. A natural person wholly or partially dependent
upon the victim for care or support, and includes a child of the victim born after the death of
the victim where the death occurred as a result of criminally injurious conduct. . . . (5)
CLAIMANT. Any of the following persons applying for compensation under this article: . . .
A victim . . . . A dependent . . . . A person authorized to act on behalf of a victim or a
dependent of a deceased victim if such victim died as a result of criminally injurious
conduct.”).
174

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 938.03 (West 2010) (costs imposed in guilty plea, nolo
contendere plea, and conviction settings).
175
In Alaska statutory fines imposed upon convicted offenders are not expressly directed to
state-funded recovery schemes. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.035(b) (West 2010) (“Upon
conviction of an offense, a defendant . . . may be sentenced to pay . . . $500,000 for murder in
the first or second degree, attempted murder in the first degree, murder of an unborn child,
sexual assault in the first degree, sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree, kidnapping,
promoting prostitution in the first degree . . . $250,000 for a class A felony . . . $100,000 for a
class B felony . . . $50,000 for a class C felony . . . $10,000 for a class A misdemeanor . . .
$2,000 for a class B misdemeanor . . . $500 for a violation.”). In other states, fines are
directed toward state funds. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-1025 (West 2010) (“In addition
to any other fine which may be imposed upon each person found guilty of criminal activity,
the court shall impose a fine or reimbursement . . . : For each conviction or finding of guilt of
each felony count, a fine or reimbursement of not less than seventy-five dollars ($75.00) per
felony count . . . ; For each conviction or finding of guilt of each misdemeanor count, a fine or
reimbursement of thirty-seven dollars ($37.00) per misdemeanor count . . . . In addition to
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monies are available to states to support their crime victim recovery programs.176
Many states mandate that losses already compensated through a collateral source,
like a criminal case recovery, are not recoverable from a state fund. In Oklahoma
the relevant Board may require the victim to “seek or accept” any possible financial
benefits from other sources.177 Georgia requires that a victim seek recovery from the
offender in order to be eligible to receive compensation.178 While Alabama does not
expressly require a “claimant to seek or accept any collateral source contribution,”179
an award may be reduced or eliminated due to actual collateral source
contributions.180 Where a victim has already recovered from a state fund, a court can
sometimes direct payments from the criminal to the state for reimbursement.181
any fine or reimbursement ordered under subsection (a) or (b) above, the court shall impose a
fine or reimbursement of not less than three hundred dollars ($300) per count for any
conviction or finding of guilt for any sex offense . . . . The fines or reimbursements imposed
under the provisions of this section shall be paid into the crime victims compensation
account.”).
176
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 10601 (West 2010) (“There is created in the Treasury a separate
account to be known as the Crime Victims Fund . . . . The Fund shall be available as follows:
. . . The first $10,000,000 deposited in the Fund shall be available for grants under section
10603a [involving grants to states for child abuse assistance programs] of this title. . . . Of the
remaining amount to be distributed from the Fund in a particular fiscal year . . . 47.5 percent
shall be available for grants under section 10602 [grants to state supported crime victim
compensation and assistance programs] of this title . . . .”).
177

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 142.7 (West 2010). Compare ALASKA. STAT. ANN. §
18.67.090 (West 2010) (“If compensation is awarded under this chapter and the person
receiving it also receives a collateral sum . . . that has not been deducted from it, the board
may require that the person refund either the amount of the collateral sum or the amount of
compensation paid to the person . . . whichever is less.”). In Alaska, civil litigation may
change the time in which a victim receives a compensation award. In response to a
questionnaire, the Administrator of Alaska’s Violent Crimes Compensation Board stated that
the Board typically defers awards until the outcome of civil litigation. Questionnaire from
Professor Jeffrey A. Parness for Kate Hudson, Adm’r, Violent Crimes Comp. Bd. (July 13,
2009).
178
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-15-8(a)(4) (West 2010) (“unless the board or director determines
that such action would not be feasible”).
179

ALA. CODE § 15-23-9 (West 2010).

180

Id. § 15-23-12(b). See also 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 45/10.1(e) (West 2010).

181

See ALA. CODE § 15-23-14(d) (“Whenever compensation is awarded to a claimant who
is entitled to restitution from a criminal defendant, the commission may initiate restitution
hearings in such criminal proceedings or intervene in the same. The commission shall be
entitled to receive restitution in such proceedings to the extent that compensation was
awarded.”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-110(3) (West 2010) (“If a defendant is ordered
to pay restitution . . . to a person who has received compensation awarded under this part 1, an
amount equal to the compensation awarded shall be transmitted from such restitution to the
board for allocation to the fund.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-1023 (West 2010) (“If a claimant
seeks compensation . . . and compensation is awarded, the account is entitled to full
subrogation against a judgment or recovery received by the claimant against the offender or
from or against any other source for all compensation paid . . . .”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.92
(West 2010) (“If a person receiving compensation under the program seeks indemnification
which would reduce the compensation . . . the department is subrogated to the recovery to the
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State-funded (as well as civil case) recoveries may differ from recoveries at
criminal case sentencing because only for the latter might there be a requirement of a
guilty plea or a conviction.182 Upon a plea for one offense, however, a criminal
defendant may be able to agree to compensate a victim for losses stemming from
another offense for which there is no plea or conviction,183 or perhaps even no formal
charge.
State-funded schemes for crime victim recovery often have caps. In Alaska,
awards cannot exceed $40,000 unless the claimant has more than one dependent,
which prompts a cap of $80,000.184 California limits the recovery to $35,000, unless
extent of payments by the department to or on behalf of the person. . . . However, legal action
by the department does not affect the right of a person to seek further relief in other legal
actions.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346.170 (West 2010) (“No right of action at law against a
person who has committed a criminal act for damages as a consequence of such act shall be
lost as a consequence of receiving benefits . . . . If compensation is awarded, the state is
subrogated to all the claimant’s rights to receive or recover benefits or advantages, for
economic loss for which and to the extent only that compensation is awarded from a source
which is, or, if readily available to the victim or claimant would be, a collateral source.”);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.61 (West 2010) (“The state shall be subrogated, to the extent of
reparations awarded, to all the claimant’s rights to recover benefits or advantages for
economic loss from a source which is or, if readily available to the victim or claimant would
be, a collateral source. Nothing in this section shall limit the claimant’s right to bring a cause
of action to recover for other damages.”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2A-22 (West 2010) (“If an
award of compensation is made . . . and is not reduced on account of the availability of
payment by a collateral source, the state, upon the payment of the award or a part of the
award, shall be subrogated to all of the claimant’s rights to receive or recover benefits or
advantages for economic loss for which an award of compensation was made . . . .”). See also
Oregon v. Romero-Navarro, 197 P.3d 30, 32-33 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that because the
Criminal Injuries Compensation Account paid the victim’s parents for burial expenses at
sentencing, the trial court could order the defendant to pay restitution to the fund as the
Account was a “victim” under the statute on restitution, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.103(4)(c)
(West 2010), because it had “expended moneys on behalf of a victim”).
182

See ALA. CODE § 15-23-13 (“[A]n award may be made whether or not any person is
prosecuted or convicted. Proof of conviction of a person whose acts give rise to a claim is
conclusive evidence that the crime was committed . . . .”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-1018(2)
(West 2010) (same); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-25-19(f) (West 2010) (“An award may be
made under this section whether or not any person is prosecuted or convicted of any offense
arising out of the act, or if the act is the subject of any other legal action.”). But see ARIZ.
CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A)(8) (“a victim of crime has a right . . . [t]o receive prompt restitution
from the person or persons convicted of the criminal conduct that caused the victim’s loss or
injury”).
183

See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-5-6(d) (West 2010) (“In instances where a
defendant has more than one criminal charge pending against him in a single case, or more
than one case, and the defendant stands convicted of one or more charges, a plea agreement
negotiated by the State’s Attorney and the defendants may require the defendant to make
restitution to victims of charges that have been dismissed or which it is contemplated will be
dismissed under the terms of the plea agreement, and under the agreement, the court may
impose a sentence of restitution on the charge or charges of which the defendant has been
convicted that would require the defendant to make restitution to victims of other offenses as
provided in the plea agreement.”).
184

ALASKA STAT. § 18.67.130(c) (West 2010).
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federal funds are available.185 In Alabama and Indiana there is a $15,000 cap.186 At
least one state differentiates the caps based on the types of expenses.187
While many state-funded schemes require crime victims to file applications with
an administrative agency,188 with the applications determined by the agency,189 in
Illinois a victim files with the Court of Claims.190 An Illinois victim must release
relevant reports, documents, and other information to the Attorney General’s
Office.191 Failure to comply with the Attorney General’s requests for information
will result in dismissal.192 The Illinois Court of Claims then considers the
application as well as a report by the Attorney General.193 Although the application
185

CAL. GOV’T CODE § 13957(b) (West 2010). If federal funds are available, the cap is
$70,000. Id.
186
ALA. CODE § 15-23-15(b); IND. CODE § 5-2-6.1-35(a)(1) (West 2010). See also 740 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. § 45/10.1(f) (West 2010) ($27,000 cap).
187
IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.86(1)-(2), (6) (West 2010) (“Reasonable charges incurred for
medical care not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars. Reasonable charges incurred for
mental health care not to exceed five thousand dollars . . . . Loss of income from work the
victim would have performed and for which the victim would have received remuneration if
the victim had not been injured, not to exceed six thousand dollars. . . . Reasonable funeral
and burial expenses not to exceed seven thousand five hundred dollars.”).
188
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.07 (West 2010) (“A claim for compensation may be filed by
a person eligible for compensation . . . . Claims may be filed in the Tallahassee office of the
department in person or by mail.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-1012 (“An applicant . . . may
apply in writing in a form that conforms substantially to that prescribed by the commission.”);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-25-19 (“[T]he victim . . . may apply to the office for
compensation.”).
189
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.09 (“The department shall have authority to allow, deny,
controvert, and litigate claims . . . and to delegate to the Crime Victims’ Services Office such
authority.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-1012 (“An applicant for an award of compensation may
apply in writing in a form that conforms substantially to that prescribed by the commission.”);
id. § 72-1018(1) (“The commission shall award compensation benefits . . . if satisfied by a
preponderance of the evidence that the requirements for compensation have been met.”); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-25-18 (“The office [of the general treasurer] . . . shall designate a
program administrator. . . . The administrator shall investigate each application for
compensation, verify the information contained on the application and in all supporting
documentation and award or deny compensation . . . .”).
190
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/6.1 (“A person is entitled to compensation under this Act
if . . . [w]ithin 2 years of the occurrence of the crime, or within one year after a criminal
indictment of a person for an offense, upon which the claim is based, he files an application,
under oath, with the Court of Claims . . . .”).
191

Id. at 45/7.1

192

Id. at 45/8.1 (“If an applicant does not submit all materials substantiating his claim as
requested . . . by the Attorney General, the Attorney General shall notify the applicant in
writing . . . that he has 30 days in which to furnish those items . . . . The Attorney General
shall report an applicant’s failure to comply within 30 days of the foregoing notice to the
Court of Claims. . . . No award of compensation shall be made for any portion of the
applicant’s claim that is not substantiated by the applicant.”).
193

Id. at 45/9.1.
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must be filed with the Court of Claims, an attorney may not collect a fee for assisting
a victim-applicant with the application.194 “Reasonable” attorney’s fees may,
however, be recovered if counsel represents the victim at a hearing.195
Outside of Illinois, victims usually apply to a special board.196 Like the Illinois
Attorney General, state boards typically cannot represent victims.197 Claimants must
file claims in a timely manner. A victim in Kentucky has five years after the
commission of a crime.198 A victim in Indiana only has 180 days.199
When waiting for an application to be processed, victims in some states can
request an emergency award. Such a recovery can be based on the probability that
the application will be granted and that the victim will suffer undue hardship if an
immediate award is not made.200 In Connecticut, an emergency award may go as
high as $2,000.201 In Indiana, an emergency award is capped at $500.202 Rhode
Island leaves the amount of any emergency award to the discretion of the board or
program director, but limits emergency burial expenses to $5,000.203 Generally,
there is no award if there are no funds.204 Many states also impose requirements on
194
Id. at 45/12 (“If the applicant is represented by counsel . . . in making [the] application
under this Act or in any further proceedings provided for in this Act, that counsel or agent
may receive no payment for his services in preparing or presenting the application before the
Court of Claims.”).
195

Id.

196

See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 15-23-4, -8 (West 2010).

197
See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/4.1 (“[T]he Attorney General shall . . . represent the
interests of the State . . . .”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 18.353(1) (West 2010) (“The
commission shall do all of the following: . . . Investigate and determine claims for awards and
reinvestigate or reopen cases as the commission considers necessary. . . . Direct medical
examination of victims. . . . Review all appeals, hold hearings, administer oaths or
affirmations, examine any person under oath or affirmation, issue subpoenas requiring the
attendance and giving of testimony of witnesses and the production of books, papers,
documentary or other evidence. . . . Take or cause to be taken affidavits or depositions within
or without the state.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1130(1), (3) (2010) (“A claim, once accepted
for filing and completed, must be assigned to a field representative. The field representative
shall examine the papers filed in support of the claim and cause an investigation to be
conducted into the validity of the claim. The investigation shall include but not be limited to
an examination of police, court, and official records and reports concerning the crime and an
examination of medical and hospital reports relating to the injury upon which the claim is
based. . . . The field representative conducting the investigation shall file with the deputy
director a written report setting forth a recommendation and his reason for the
recommendation. The deputy director shall render a written decision and furnish the claimant
with a copy of the decision.”).
198

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346.060(2) (West 2010).

199

IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.1-16(b) (West 2010).

200

ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.67.120 (West 2010).

201

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-217 (West 2010).

202

IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.1-36(a).

203

R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-25-21.1(b)-(c) (West 2010).
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crime victims, including clean hands205 and cooperation throughout any criminal
process.206 At times, recovery is only available for harm due to violence.207
Besides providing for recoveries, some state-funded schemes provide services to
crime victims as well. In Virginia, the scheme funds a crime victims ombudsman.208
The Rhode Island scheme assists crime victims by informing them of their rights.209
In Georgia, ten percent of the fund is designated for victim service providers and for
dissemination of materials about crime victim recovery.210
There are some interstate differences in funding. Usually there is an assessment
against an offender that is placed into a fund.211 The amounts collected vary. Some
states, like Colorado, have a flat assessment regardless of the offense, with no

204

See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-15-9 (West 2010) (“[U]nless and until sufficient funds
become available,” awards are “paid in chronological order.”).
205

See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-23-12(a)(2) (West 2010).

206

See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-108(1)(c) (West 2010).

207

See IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.1-7 (defining “victim” as “an individual who suffers bodily
injury or death as a result of a violent crime”); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-15-7(g) (“No award . . .
for loss of property.”). But see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-109(1.5)(a)(I)(A), (B)
(allowing recoveries for damage to residential property including reimbursement of insurance
deductible).
208

VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.3:1 (West 2010).

209

R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-25-29.

210

GA. CODE ANN. § 17-15-14. See also IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.83 (West 2010) (“The
department shall . . . [p]ublicize through the department, county sheriff departments,
municipal police departments, county attorney offices, and other public or private agencies,
the existence of the crime victim compensation program, including the procedures for
obtaining compensation under the program.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.56 (West 2010)
(“[T]he board shall . . . publicize widely the availability of reparations and the method of
making claims . . . .”). Also note that referrals for victim compensation can come from other
sources. Minnesota notes in its 2008 annual report that while 49% of victim referrals come
from a victim service provider, 39 of 1819 claims were referred by a funeral home, while 49
referrals came from “unknown” sources. MINN. CRIME VICTIMS REPARATIONS BD., MINN.
DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 7 (2008).
211
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 938.03 (West 2010) (“Any person pleading guilty or nolo
contendere to, or being convicted of . . . any felony, misdemeanor . . . or criminal traffic
offense . . . shall pay as an additional cost . . . the sum of $50. . . . These costs shall not be
waived . . . . The clerk of the court shall . . . forward $49 of each $50 . . . to be deposited in the
Crimes Compensation Trust Fund.”). In fiscal year (“FY”) 2008, “court fines and restitution
amounts contributed over $2.7 million, or 79%, of program funding” in Delaware. VIOLENT
CRIMES COMP. BD., STATE OF DEL., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2008). In West Virginia, for FY
2008, state funds collected through fines and costs to defendants totaled $1,633,260. CRIME
VICTIMS COMP. BD., W.V. COURT OF CLAIMS, ANNUAL REPORT 2009, at 3 (2008). In
Minnesota, 24% of the compensation fund for FY 2008 came from “restitution payments . . .
unclaimed restitution, funds from civil awards paid to victims, and inmate wage deductions
transferred from the Minnesota Department of Corrections.” MINN. CRIME VICTIMS
REPARATIONS BD., MINN. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 9
(2008). In Idaho, fines, restitution, and subrogation accounted for $2,321,600 in FY 2008.
IDAHO INDUS. COMM’N, STATE OF IDAHO, ANNUAL REPORT 2008, at 5 (2008).
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judicial discretion.212 Others have a range depending upon the level of the crime,
with some judicial discretion. Oklahoma assesses offenders from $50 to $10,000 for
each injurious felony,213 $45 to $1,000 for each other felony, and $30 to $300 for
each misdemeanor.214 In Alabama, the assessment is $50 to $10,000 for each felony
and $25 to $1,000 for each misdemeanor.215 In determining discretionary
assessments, courts often consider “the severity of the crime, the prior criminal
record, and the ability of the defendant to pay, as well as the economic impact of the
victim compensation assessment on the dependents of the defendant.”216
State-funded recoveries are also available for victims in federal criminal cases.
The federal Crime Victims Fund217 assists states in funding their crime victim
recovery schemes. Unlike state funds that provide monies directly to crime victims,
the federal fund simply awards grants to states.218 Since 2002, the Crime Victims
Fund makes annual grants constituting about sixty percent of the monies available to
state funds.219 To receive grants, state funds must qualify. Eligible funds must be
operated by the state, offer compensatory awards to victims,220 and promote victim
cooperation with law enforcement.221 Grant recipients must also certify that the state
will not cut funds already available,222 that the fund does not discriminate between
citizens and non-citizens223 or between victims of state offenses and federal
offenses,224 that the fund will not deny claimants based on their family or residential
relationship with the alleged offender,225 and that the fund will not support a claimant
212

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-119(1)(a) ($163 for felonies and $78 for
misdemeanors).
213

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 142.18(A) (West 2010).

214

Id. § 142.18(B).

215

ALA. CODE § 15-23-17(b) (West 2010).

216

ALA. CODE § 15-23-17(b). See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 142.18(A) (“In addition
to the imposition of any costs, penalties or fines imposed pursuant to law, any person
convicted of, pleading guilty to or agreeing to a deferred judgment procedure . . . shall be
ordered to pay a victim compensation assessment of at least Fifty Dollars ($50.00), but not to
exceed Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000) . . . . In imposing this penalty, the court shall
consider factors such as the severity of the crime, the prior criminal record, the expenses of
the victim of the crime, and the ability of the defendant to pay, as well as the economic impact
of the victim compensation assessment on the dependents of the defendant.”).
217

42 U.S.C.A. § 10601 (West 2010).

218

Id. § 10602(a)(1) (“[T]he Director shall make an annual grant from the Fund to an
eligible crime victim compensation program . . . .”).
219

Id.

220

Id. § 10602(b)(1).

221

Id. § 10602(b)(2).

222

Id. § 10602(b)(3) (“such State certifies that grants received under this section will not be
used to supplant State funds otherwise available to provide victim compensation”).
223

Id. § 10602(b)(4).

224

Id. § 10602(b)(5).

225

Id. § 10602(b)(7).
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who has “been convicted of an offense under Federal law with respect to any time
period during which the person is delinquent in paying a fine, other monetary
penalty, or restitution imposed for the offense.”226 The federal Crime Victims Fund
also assists with crime victim legal aid227 and with child abuse prevention and
treatment.228 Furthermore, it supports victims of domestic229 and international
terrorism.230
E. Criminal Case Recoveries
Beside civil claim and state-funded recoveries, crime victims can recover during
criminal case sentencing. Restitution is the term often used, though the same term is
also used for recoveries in civil cases or from state funds. State approaches to
criminal case recoveries differ, including variations on what is recoverable,
collection procedures, and enforcement.
Recoveries at sentencing typically require a conviction, upon either trial or
plea.231 However, some states allow recoveries when a criminal defendant pleads

226

Id. § 10602(b)(8).

227

Id. § 10603d (“The Director may make grants . . . to develop, establish, and maintain
programs for the enforcement of crime victims’ rights as provided by law. . . . Grant amounts
under this section may not be used to bring a cause of action for damages.”).
228

Id. § 10603a.

229

Id. § 10603b(b) (“The Director may make supplemental grants . . . to States, victim
service organizations, and public agencies (including Federal, State, or local governments)
and nongovernmental organizations that provide assistance to victims of crime, which shall be
used to provide emergency relief, including crisis response efforts, assistance, compensation,
training, and technical assistance, and ongoing assistance, including during any investigation
or prosecution, to victims of terrorists acts or mass violence occurring within the United
States.”).
230
Id. § 10603b(a)(1) (“The Director may make supplemental grants . . . to States . . .
victim service organizations, public agencies (including Federal, State, or local governments)
and nongovernmental organizations that provide assistance to victims of crime, which shall be
used to provide emergency relief, including crisis response efforts, assistance, training, and
technical assistance, and ongoing assistance, including during any investigation or
prosecution, to victims of terrorist acts or mass violence occurring outside the United
States.”); id. § 10603c(b) (“The Director may use the emergency reserve . . . to carry out a
program to compensate victims of acts of international terrorism that occur outside the United
States for expenses associated with that victimization.”).
231
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-18-65 (West 2010) (“[I]t is essential . . . that all perpetrators
of criminal activity . . . be required to fully compensate all victims of such conduct . . . .”).
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nolo contendere.232 Notably, at least several states allow recoveries at sentencing for
uncharged offenses and for charges dismissed pursuant to plea agreements.233
States sometimes mandate that recovery be ordered at sentencing. Iowa, for
example, mandates that “[i]n all criminal cases in which there is a plea of guilty,
verdict of guilty, or special verdict upon which a judgment of conviction is rendered,
the sentencing court shall order that restitution be made.”234 Other states recognize
some judicial discretion, as in Florida where judges can find “clear and compelling
reasons not to order such restitution.”235 Florida does require a judge to state the
reasons for not ordering restitution.236 In Maryland, a “victim is presumed to have a
right to restitution.”237
In assessing recoveries at sentencing, many states require victims to prove their
damages.238 In South Carolina, the court “must hold a hearing to determine the
232

See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-201(5) (West 2010) (“[I]f a person has been found
guilty of an offense upon a verdict of guilty or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and the
sentencing judge finds that a victim . . . has sustained a pecuniary loss, the sentencing judge
shall, as part of the sentence, require payment of full restitution to the victim . . . .”); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-17-1 (West 2010) (“‘[C]riminal activities’ includes any crime for which
there is a plea of guilty or verdict of guilty . . . and any other crime committed after July 1,
1977 which is admitted or not contested by the defendant . . . .”).
233
See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-2280 (LexisNexis 2010) (“With the consent of the
parties, the court may order restitution for the . . . loss sustained by the victim of an uncharged
offense or an offense dismissed pursuant to plea negotiations.”); State v. Green, 28 So. 3d
1105, 1109 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (applying comparable law, LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 883.2
(2010)). But see State v. Colon, 925 N.E.2d 212, 214-15 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010) (finding that
an aggravated arson conviction upon trial cannot support restitution for stolen property
admitted to by criminal defendant in the arson case).
234

IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.2 (West 2010). See also ALA. CODE § 15-18-67 (“When a
defendant is convicted of a criminal activity or conduct which has resulted in pecuniary
damages or loss to a victim, the court shall hold a hearing to determine the amount or type of
restitution due to the victim or victims of such defendant’s criminal acts. Such restitution
hearings shall be held as a matter of course and in addition to any other sentence which it may
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution or otherwise compensate such
victim for any pecuniary damages.”); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-5-6 (West 2010)
(mandating restitution for all convictions under the 1961 Criminal Code where there is
personal injury or property damage).
235

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089(1)(a) (West 2010).

236

Id. § 775.089(1)(b) (requiring the court to state reasons also when it “orders restitution
of only a portion of the damages”).
237
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-603(b) (West 2010) (if restitution is requested and
evidence of actual expenses or injury is presented).
238

See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.200 (West 2010) (“The court in which the
conviction is had, if applied to by verified petition made within ninety (90) days of the date
the sentence was pronounced, may order restitution or give judgment . . . for reparation in
damages . . . . In a petition for restitution or reparation, the court shall cause the defendant, if
in custody, to be brought into court, and demand of him if he has any defense to make to the
petition. If he consents to the restitution or to reparation in damages in an agreed sum, the
court shall give judgment accordingly. Otherwise a jury shall be impaneled to try the facts
and ascertain the amount and the value of the property, or assess the damage, as the case may
be.”).
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amount of restitution due the victim” as a result of the defendant’s criminal acts.239
This hearing must be held unless the defendant agrees to an amount on the record.240
In Alabama, the court “shall hold a hearing” to determine the recoveries,241 with the
court entering findings of facts after a hearing where the defendant, victim, district
attorney, and other interested parties may be heard.242
Some responsibility for securing recoveries at sentencing is assigned to
prosecutors and other law enforcement officials. A Utah statute provides that “[a]ny
law enforcement agency conducting an investigation for criminal conduct which
would constitute a felony or class A misdemeanor shall provide in their investigative
reports whether a claim for restitution exists, the basis for the claim, and the
estimated or actual amount of the claim.”243 In Oklahoma, the district attorney,
during a plea bargain “in every case where the victim has suffered economic loss,
shall, as a part of the plea bargain, require that the offender pay restitution to the
crime victim.”244 In Pennsylvania, “[i]t shall be the responsibility of the district
attorneys . . . to make a recommendation . . . as to the amount of restitution.”245 In
Wyoming, while the “prosecuting attorney shall present to the court any claim for
restitution submitted by any victim,”246 there is no duty to investigate or to
independently seek recovery for the victim.247 In Oregon, prosecutors must
investigate and present evidence of crime victim losses.248
Some states require judges to consider a defendant’s ability to pay when
determining recovery, while others expressly prohibit this. In Alabama, “the court
may take into consideration . . . [t]he financial resources of the defendant . . . [and]

239

S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-322(A) (West 2010).

240

Id.

241

ALA. CODE § 15-18-67.

242

Id. § 15-18-69 (allowing these parties to be heard on the issue of restitution).

243

UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-201 (West 2010).

244
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 991f(E)(4) (West 2010). Furthermore, the district attorney
“shall be authorized to act as a clearing house for collection and disbursement of restitution
payments.” Id.
245
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1106(c)(4)(i) (West 2010). The district attorney has the
obligation to elicit information from the victim, and in the event that the victim has not
responded to the district attorney’s request for restitution information, the district attorney
“shall, based on other available information, make a recommendation to the court for
restitution.” Id. § 1106(c)(4)(ii).
246

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-103 (West 2010).

247

Id. § 7-9-111 (“[T]he prosecuting attorney has no obligation to investigate alleged
pecuniary damages or to petition the court for restitution on behalf of a victim. In the event
that the victim is not satisfied with the restitution plan approved or modified by the court, the
victim’s sole and exclusive remedy is a civil action.”).
248

OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.106(1) (West 2010) (“When a person is convicted of a
crime . . . that has resulted in economic damages, the district attorney shall investigate and
present to the court, prior to the time of sentencing, evidence of the nature and amount of the
damages.”).
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[t]he ability of the defendant to pay restitution.”249 In contrast, a court in Alaska
“may not, in ordering the amount of restitution, consider the defendant’s ability to
pay restitution.”250 Similarly, in Florida judges can only consider the victim’s loss in
determining the amount of restitution.251 In Arizona, a court “shall not consider the
economic circumstances of the defendant in determining the amount of
restitution,”252 but should consider these circumstances when determining the
manner of payment.253 Some state courts must consider the possible rehabilitative
effects of restitution orders on criminal defendants.254
Whether or not a criminal defendant’s financial ability is considered, any earlier
ability to pay becomes irrelevant if a criminal defendant’s resources are depleted
after the crime but prior to any recovery order. Pennsylvania helps victims by
allowing for an asset preservation order relating to a criminal defendant’s property in
anticipation of a later recovery order:
[T]he court may enter a restraining order or injunction to preserve the
availability of property which may be necessary to satisfy an anticipated
restitution order . . . if . . . there is a substantial probability that:
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)

the Commonwealth will prevail on the underlying
criminal charges or allegation of delinquency;
restitution will be ordered exceeding $10,000 in value;
the property appears to be necessary to satisfy such
restitution order; and
failure to enter the order will result in the property being
. . . unavailable for payment of the anticipated restitution
order . . . .255

These standards are somewhat comparable to the standards for interlocutory
injunctions in civil cases.256
249

ALA. CODE § 15-18-68 (determining manner, method, or amount of restitution).

250

ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.045(g) (West 2010).

251

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089(6)(a) (West 2010) (statute is silent on defendant’s financial
abilities); id. § 775.089(6)(b) (“The criminal court, at the time of enforcement of the
restitution order, shall consider the financial resources of the defendant.”).
252

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-804(C) (2010).

253

Id. § 13-804(E).

254
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-18-68 (“In determining the manner, method, or amount of
restitution to be ordered, the court may take into consideration all of the following: . . . [t]he
anticipated rehabilitative effect on the defendant regarding the manner of restitution or the
method of payment.”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-205(e)(2) (West 2010) (“In determining the
method of payment, the court shall take into account . . . [t]he rehabilitative effect on the
defendant of the payment of restitution and the method of payment.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 9937-3 (West 2010) (“In determining whether to order restitution which may be complete,
partial or nominal, the court shall take into account . . . [t]he rehabilitative effect on the
defendant of the payment of restitution and the method of payment.”).
255

42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9728(e)(2)(i) (West 2010) (the burden on the defendant
must be outweighed by the need to preserve the property).
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Statutes often delineate the specific losses recoverable at sentencing. Medical
expenses, lost wages, counseling expenses, lost or damaged property, and funeral
expenses are often included.257 Colorado permits recoveries for “anticipated future
expenses” as well as past losses.258 California provides for interest on crime victim
recovery orders.259
Some states restrict recoverable losses to actual pecuniary losses proximately
caused by criminal conduct, thus excluding pain and suffering. A Connecticut
statute says:
Restitution ordered by the court . . . shall be based on easily ascertainable
damages for injury or loss of property, actual expenses incurred for
treatment for injury to persons and lost wages resulting from injury.
Restitution shall not include reimbursement for damages for mental
anguish, pain and suffering or other intangible losses, but may include the
costs of counseling reasonably related to the offense.260
While punitive, pain and suffering, and loss of consortium recoveries are unavailable
at sentencing in Georgia, criminal procedure laws do suggest that such recoveries are
available in separate civil actions.261
256

See PA. R. CIV. P. 1531(a) (“A court shall issue a preliminary or special injunction only
after written notice and hearing unless it appears to the satisfaction of the court that immediate
and irreparable injury will be sustained before notice can be given or a hearing held, in which
case the court may issue a preliminary or special injunction without a hearing or without
notice. In determining whether a preliminary or special injunction should be granted and
whether notice or a hearing should be required, the court may act on the basis of the
averments of the pleadings or petition and may consider affidavits of parties or third persons
or any other proof which the court may require.”); Everett v. Harron, 110 A.2d 383, 387 (Pa.
1955) (“‘In general, these conditions are, that unless relief is granted a substantial right of the
plaintiff will be impaired to a material degree; that the remedy at law is inadequate; and that
injunctive relief can be applied with practical success and without imposing an impossible
burden on the court or bringing its processes into disrepute.’” (quoting Kenyon v. City of
Chicopee, 70 N.E.2d 241, 244-45 (Mass. 1946))).
257

See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.4(f)(3) (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089(2)(a), (b)
(West 2010).
258

COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-602(3)(a) (West 2010) (no recoveries for loss of
consortium, loss of future earnings, physical or mental pain and suffering and punitive
damages).
259

CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.4(f)(3)(G) (assessing ten percent).

260

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-28(c) (West 2010).

261
See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-9 (West 2010) (“The amount of restitution ordered shall
not exceed the victim’s damages”); id. § 17-14-3 (“[I]n addition to any other penalty imposed
by law, a judge of any court of competent jurisdiction shall . . . order an offender to make full
restitution . . . .”); id. § 17-14-10 (“In determining the nature and amount of restitution, the
ordering authority shall consider . . . [t]he amount of damages . . . .”); id. § 17-14-2(9)
(“‘Victim’ means any . . . [n]atural person or his or her personal representative or, if the victim
is deceased, his or her estate; or . . . [a]ny firm, partnership, association, public or private
corporation, or governmental entity . . . suffering damages caused by an offender’s lawful act
. . . . ”); id. § 17-14-2(2) (“‘Damages’ means all special damages which a victim could recover
against an offender in a civil action, including a wrongful death action, based on the same act
or acts for which the offender is sentenced, except punitive damages and damages for pain and
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In some instances, a government can be a crime victim for purposes of victim
recovery in criminal cases. Consider state entities that expend monies to cover
victim injuries arising from crime.262 However, law enforcement agencies that suffer
property losses during attempts to apprehend suspected criminals often are not
considered crime victims at sentencing.263
While crime victim recoveries at sentencing are not specifically addressed in the
federal Constitution, certain crime victims under the federal Crime Victims Act have
the “right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.”264 However, restitution
opportunities have never been available to all victims. For example, one court has
ruled that plaintiffs suing under the Federal Tort Claims Act could not utilize Victim
Rights Act protections when there is no “allegation of ongoing or contemplated
criminal prosecution.”265 A 2010 survey of Article III federal court judges found that
suffering, mental anguish, or loss of consortium. Such special damages shall not be limited by
any law which may cap economic damages. Special damages may include the reasonably
determined costs of transportation to and from court proceedings related to the prosecution of
the crime.”). These statutes all appear in the Restitution and Distribution of Profits to Victims
of Crimes Chapter of the Criminal Procedure Statutes.
262
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-5-3(a) (West 2010) (“[T]he court may . . . order the
person to make restitution to the victim of the crime . . . . The court shall base its restitution
order upon a consideration of . . . property damages of the victim incurred as a result of the
crime . . . medical and hospital costs incurred by the victim (before the date of sentencing) as a
result of the crime . . . .”). For example, in Ault v. Indiana the court held that because the
victim was afflicted with shaken baby syndrome as a result of the defendant’s actions and the
victim’s medical costs would be approximately $10,000 a month, most of which would be
covered by Medicaid, restitution was to be made jointly to the victim’s mother and the State of
Indiana. Ault v. Indiana, 705 N.E.2d 1078, 1080-82 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). The court reasoned
that the state had no choice in its expenditure of costs and that those costs were made in
“direct support of the victim of a crime.” Id. at 1082. But see Bockler v. Indiana, 908 N.E.2d
342 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that the trial court was not authorized to order restitution for
the depreciation of rescue equipment used during an underwater search for a fleeing
defendant).
263
See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 973.20 (West 2010) (“When imposing sentence . . . for any
crime . . . the court . . . shall order the defendant to make full or partial restitution . . . to any
victim of a crime . . . .”); Wisconsin v. Haase, 716 N.W.2d 526, 530 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006)
(finding the trial court’s restitution order to the sheriff’s department for the replacement of a
squad car was improper, reasoning that the defendant, in eluding police officers on a high
speed chase, did not directly cause damage to the property of the sheriff’s department because
“the loss of the squad car was a collateral expense incurred in the normal course of law
enforcement”; the court did opine that the deputies themselves would have qualified as direct
victims); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.18 (West 2010) (“Restitution by the offender to the
victim of the offender’s crime . . . in an amount based on the victim’s economic loss. . . . If the
court imposes restitution, the court may base the amount [on multiple sources] provided that
the amount the court orders as restitution shall not exceed the amount of the economic loss
suffered by the victim as a direct and proximate result of the commission of the offense.”);
Ohio v. Toler, 882 N.E.2d 28, 30-33 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d 2007) (holding that the restitution
order made to the sheriff’s department for extradition expenses could not be recovered, as
those costs did not stem directly from the domestic violence charge on which the defendant
was convicted).
264

18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(6) (West 2010).
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two thirds “agreed somewhat or strongly that courts should have the authority to
order restitution for victims in all cases.”266
In federal criminal cases, the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act specially dictates
recoveries at sentencing for certain crimes following conviction upon trial or plea.267
A victim is defined under the Act as one directly and proximately affected by
criminal conduct268 as well as the legal guardian of a minor, incompetent, or
incapacitated victim, or the representative of a deceased victim’s estate.269 The Act
makes recoveries at sentencing mandatory under certain circumstances, including
crimes of violence,270 offenses committed by fraud or deceit,271 and offenses
involving the tampering of consumer products272 when an “identifiable victim or
victims . . . suffered a physical injury or pecuniary loss.”273 The Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act does not operate when “the number of identifiable victims is so large
as to make restitution impracticable”274 or when “determining complex issues of fact
265
Daugherty v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1286 (N.D. Okla. 2002) (“Plaintiffs’
claims directly against United States also fail. . . . As the magistrate judge points out,
plaintiff’s claim for restitution under the Victims of Crime Act borders on the frivolous. The
right to restitution . . . appears in the context of sentencing a convicted criminal under 18
U.S.C. §§ 3663, 3664. There is no allegation of ongoing or contemplated criminal
prosecution in this matter.”).
266
Marcia Coyle, Judges Give Thumbs Down to Crack, Pot, Porn Mandatory Minimums,
NAT’L L.J., June 16, 2010, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id
=1202462732111 (639 of 942 judges responded to U.S. Sentencing Commission survey).
267
18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(a)(1) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, when
sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense . . . the court shall order, in addition to, or in
the case of a misdemeanor, in addition to or in lieu of, any other penalty authorized by law,
that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense or, if the victim is deceased, to
the victim’s estate.”). The Act’s limits on the types of recoveries available have been rightly
criticized in Cassell Testimony, supra note 115, at 3-10 (stating that “consequential” and
“remote” losses are deemed by the federal appellate courts as outside the Act).
268

18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(a)(2) (“For the purposes of this section, the term ‘victim’ means a
person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense for which
restitution may be ordered including, in the case of an offense that involves as an element a
scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity, any person directly harmed by the
defendant’s criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.”).
269
Id. § 3663A(a)(2) (“In the case of a victim who is under 18 years of age, incompetent,
incapacitated, or deceased, the legal guardian of the victim or representative of the victim’s
estate . . . may assume the victim’s rights under this section, but in no event shall the
defendant be named as such representative or guardian.”).
270

Id. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(i).

271

Id. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii).

272

Id. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(iii).

273

Id. § 3663A(c)(1)(B); see also id. § 3663A(c)(2) (“In the case of a plea agreement that
does not result in a conviction for an offense described in paragraph (1), this section shall
apply only if the plea specifically states that an offense listed under such paragraph gave rise
to the plea agreement.”).
274

Id. § 3663A(c)(3)(A).
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related to the cause or amount of the victim’s losses would complicate or prolong the
sentencing process to a degree that the need to provide restitution to any victim is
outweighed by the burden on the sentencing process.”275
If a criminal defendant has been found guilty of criminal conduct outside of the
Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, the federal Victim and Witness Protection Act
bestows upon federal courts permissive authority to award recoveries at
sentencing.276 “Victim” is defined the same way in both the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act and the Victim and Witness Protection Act.277 Under the Victim and
Witness Protection Act, the court may order recoveries for losses encompassing
property damage;278 medical, psychiatric, and psychological care for victims of sex
crimes;279 funeral expenses;280 lost income; and child care and other expenses related
to aiding with the prosecution.281 Furthermore, organizations designated by the
victim or the victim’s estate can recover under this Act.282
Under the federal Victim and Witness Protection Act, recoveries at sentencing
need not involve crime victims. There can be orders benefiting government
programs where there are unidentifiable victims.283 When the government so
275

Id. § 3663A(c)(3)(B). There are other limits. See Cassell Testimony, supra note 115, at
4 (stating that certain losses are not covered and too often there are “inadequate enforcement
tools”). But see United States v. Masek, 588 F.3d 1283, 1290 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding that
civil settlement with victim did not foreclose additional MVRA restitution order).
276

18 U.S.C.A. § 3663 (“The court, when sentencing a defendant . . . other than an offense
described in section 3663A(c), may order, in addition to or, in the case of a misdemeanor, in
lieu of any other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution to any victim
of such offense, or if the victim is deceased, to the victim’s estate. The court may also order,
if agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement, restitution to persons other than the victim of
the offense.”).
277

See id. § 3663A(a)(2) (providing the definition of victim in the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act); id. § 3663(a)(2) (providing the definition of victim in the Victim and Witness
Protection Act).
278

Id. § 3663(b)(1)(B).

279

Id. § 3663(b)(2).

280

Id. § 3663(b)(3).

281

Id. § 3663(b)(4). This Act’s limits on the types of crimes and losses covered have been
rightly criticized in Cassell Testimony, supra note 115, at 11-16 (proposing that recoveries be
available for victims of all federal offenses, subject to judicial discretion, and that recoverable
losses be expanded to include a “but for” test, as well as consequential damages and attorney’s
fees).
282

18 U.S.C.A. § 3663(b)(5) (“[I]n any case, if the victim (or if the victim is deceased, the
victim’s estate) consents, make restitution in services in lieu of money, or make restitution to
person or organization designated by the victim or the estate . . . .”).
283

Id. § 3663(c)(1) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law (but subject to the
provisions of subsections (a)(1)(B)(i)(II) and (ii), (footnote omitted) when sentencing a
defendant convicted of an offense described in section 401, 408(a), 409, 416, 420 or 422(a) of
the Controlled Substances Act . . . in which there is no identifiable victim, the court may order
that the defendant make restitution in accordance with this subsection.”). See also id. §
3663(c)(2)(A) (“An order of restitution under this subsection shall be based on the amount of
public harm caused by the offense, as determined by the court . . . .”).
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recovers, sixty-five percent of the total amount paid goes to state entity responsible
for administering crime victim assistance284 and thirty-five percent goes to the “State
entity designated to receive Federal substance abuse block grant funds.”285
When a crime victim recovery at sentencing under the Victim and Witness
Protection Act may “interfere with a forfeiture,” the court “shall not make an
award.”286 This forfeiture priority stands in stark contrast to crime victim priority in
California.287 However, under the federal Act, individual and other crime victims
“receive full restitution before the United States.”288
In federal district courts, monetary recoveries at sentencing are ordered without
consideration of a defendant’s ability to pay.289 As with state statutory guidelines, a
victim’s compensation from a collateral source can offset a recovery order under the
Victim and Witness Protection Act.290
There are often substantial obstacles for victims seeking recoveries in state or
federal criminal cases. Some exist regardless of what statutes may say about any
affirmative duty of prosecutors to assist victims with recovery. For example, in
January 2010 the Oregon Secretary of State published findings of a state-wide audit
on restitution at criminal case sentencing.291 The Secretary of State obtained
sentencing information from criminal convictions in every Oregon county between
July 1, 2007 and June 30, 2008.292 With the assistance of the Oregon Department of
Justice and the Marion County District Attorney’s Office, particular crimes were
identified as “more likely to result in economic loss,” such as assault, theft,
homicide, robbery, and forgery.293 In this one-year span, only thirty-six percent of
convictions involving such crimes had recovery orders.294 The auditors reviewed
District Attorney records in four counties to learn why recoveries often were not

284

Id. § 3663(c)(3)(A).

285

Id. § 3663(c)(3)(B).

286

Id. § 3663(c)(4).

287

CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(13)(c) (“All monetary payments, monies, and property
collected . . . shall be first applied to pay the amounts ordered as restitution to the victim.”).
288

18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(i).

289

18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(f)(1)(A) (“In each order of restitution, the court shall order
restitution to . . . each victim’s losses as determined by the court and without consideration of
the economic circumstances of the defendant.”).
290

Id. § 3664(j). Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (Section 3663A) recovery is ordered
pursuant to the procedures in the Victim and Witness Protection Act (Section 3664) and the
offset provision of the latter is applied to the former. Id. § 3663A(d) (“An order of restitution
under this section shall be issued and enforced in accordance with section 3664.”).
291

OR. SEC’Y OF STATE, AUDIT REPORT, ORDERING RESTITUTION FOR VICTIMS (2010),
available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/audits/reports/full/2010/2010-08B.pdf [hereinafter
AUDIT].
292

Id. at 3.

293

Id.

294
Id. The Secretary of State address that the statistics leave room for cases where stolen
items had been recovered. Id. at 4.
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ordered.295 In half of the reviewed cases, there was no order because the victim had
either suffered no loss or was compensated by other means.296 In one third of the
remaining cases the victim did not provide requested information.297 In the
remaining cases, the prosecutor did not fully investigate victim’s losses or did not
request recoveries when losses were identified.298
Included in the cases where the victims did not provide information were
domestic relations disputes between criminal defendants and victims where the
victims desired to stay with the defendants or did not wish defendants to incur
additional financial obligations.299 In the remaining cases, the auditors noted that
prosecutors did not send out inquiry forms, did not follow up after the inquiry forms
had been mailed, or failed to request recoveries though losses were documented.300
In cases where prosecutors did not request crime victim recoveries, the auditors
noted that sometimes prosecutors forgot to request, did not notice the documentation
of losses, and, in one case, chose not to request after considering the defendant’s
financial situation.301 As to proposals on improving crime victim recovery at
sentencing, many Oregon District Attorneys stated that low funding prevented them
from allocating more personnel to investigating, verifying, and supervising crime
victim recovery requests.302 The allocation of more existing personnel to recovery
issues would make less personnel available to prosecute crime, which many
prosecutors felt was their prime objective.303 While the Oregon findings are limited,
similar problems likely face crime victims in other states.
F. Enforcing Monetary Recoveries for Crime Victims
Recovery orders do not ensure actual recoveries. For example, a prosecutor’s
failure to charge in the information all the property stolen may make full recovery by
the victim difficult.304 Recoveries may also be hampered by the criminal’s inability
to pay.
Special laws can promote more effective enforcement. Additionally, compliance
may be more easily secured when orders are entered pursuant to agreements. Texas
295
Id. at 5. Two hundred and ten case records were reviewed (including records for Coos,
Deschutes, and Marion counties).
296

Id. at 6.

297

Id. at 7.

298

Id.

299

Id.

300

Id. at 7-8.

301

Id. at 8.

302

Id. at 9, 15-20.

303

Id. at 9.

304

In Simmons v. Florida, for example, where a criminal defendant was charged in an
information with stealing two ladders-valued at $100 per ladder, the appellate court found that
the trial court’s restitution order of $3400, based on the theft of 34 ladders, was in error
because the restitution was not “causally connected to the offense,” as there was no
connection between much of the restitution order and the loss alleged in the information.
Simmons v. Florida, 974 So. 2d 531, 531 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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and Virginia promote greater opportunities for settlement recoveries by enabling
some crime victims to address, in a safe, face-to-face setting, those who caused
harm. Texas trains “volunteers to act as mediators between victims, guardians of
victims, and close relatives of deceased victims and offenders.”305 It also provides
“mediation services . . . if requested by a victim.”306 Virginia has “a victim-offender
reconciliation program to provide an opportunity to a victim after conviction, upon
request and agreement of the offender, to: (1) Meet with the offender in a safe,
controlled environment; (2) Give to the offender a summary of the effects; (3)
Discuss a proposed restitution agreement.”307
1. Government Failures to Enforce Recoveries
Governmental failures to secure and enforce recoveries benefiting crime victims
do not prompt separate claims against government.308 A Wisconsin statute provides
that “[n]o cause of action for money damages may arise against the state” for
violation of victims’ rights.309 Yet, there are exceptions, as where a state’s failure
goes beyond simple negligence. An Arizona law provides that a “victim has the
right to recover damages from a governmental entity responsible for the intentional,
knowing or grossly negligent violation of the victim’s rights.”310 Incidentally, in
Arizona, a crime victim has a constitutional right “[t]o receive prompt restitution
from the person or persons convicted of the criminal conduct that caused the victim’s
loss or injury.”311
As in many states, crime victims in the federal courts do not have claims when a
United States officer fails to honor victims’ rights.312 The federal statutory rights of
crime victims are not to “be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the
Attorney General or any officer under his direction.”313
American governments can help crime victims secure monetary recoveries by
strengthening enforcement procedures. In Indiana, there is a crime victim rights
305

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.13(1) (West 2010).

306

Id. art. 56.13(2).

307

VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-11.4(A) (West 2010).

308
For example, a prosecutor’s failure to charge in the information all the property stolen
may make full recovery by the victim more difficult. See, e.g., Simmons, 974 So. 2d at 531.
309

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 950.10 (West 2010). See also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/9
(West 2010) (“Any act of omission or commission by any law enforcement officer, circuit
court clerk, or State’s Attorney . . . shall not impose civil liability upon the individual . . . or
employer.”).
310

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4437(B) (2010) (“A victim has the right to recover
damages from a governmental entity responsible for the intentional, knowing or grossly
negligent violation of the victim’s rights under the victims’ bill of rights, article II, § 2.1,
Constitution of Arizona . . . .”).
311

ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1.

312

18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(6) (West 2010) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to
authorize a cause of action for damages or to create, to enlarge, or to imply any duty or
obligation to any victim or other person for the breach of which the United States or any of its
officers or employees could be held liable in damages.”).
313

Id. § 3771(d)(6).
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statute, including a right to restitution.314 There, a victim has standing to assert the
crime victim rights noted in the statutes.315 By contrast, in Louisiana the crime
victim rights statute simply says that “[n]othing . . . precludes filing for a writ of
mandamus . . . to compel the performance of a ministerial duty required by law.”316
Wisconsin has a different approach to enforcement. Although a victim cannot
seek monetary damages from governments or their agents for denials of victims’
rights,317 a Wisconsin statute declares that “[t]he department [of justice] may receive
complaints, seek to mediate complaints and, with the consent of the involved parties,
actually mediate complaints regarding the treatment of crime victims.”318
Mistreatment can involve restitution rights.319 Following departmental action, a
victim may request review by a crime victims’ rights board. This board may:
(a) Issue private and public reprimands of public officials . . . that violate
the rights of crime victims . . . .
(b) Refer to the judicial commission a violation or alleged violation by a
judge of the rights of crime victims . . . .
(c) Seek appropriate equitable relief on behalf of a victim . . . .
(d) Bring civil actions to assess a forfeiture . . . .320
Some state statutes speak directly to enforcement. In Illinois, a criminal court
order is enforceable as a civil judgment.321 In Arizona “[a] criminal restitution order
does not expire until paid in full.”322 In Pennsylvania, “any lien obtained . . . shall
314
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-40-5-7 (West 2010) (“A victim has the right to pursue an order of
restitution and other civil remedies against the person convicted of a crime against the
victim.”).
315

Id. § 35-40-2-1 (West 2010).

316

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1844(U) (2010) (with no cause of action for costs, fees, or
damages). See also United States v. Aguirre-Gonzalez, 597 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding
that victims denied rights under the federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act cannot appeal denials
of their rights except through mandamus petitions); Paul G. Cassell, Protecting Crime Victims
in Federal Appellate Courts: The Need to Broadly Construe the Crime Victims’ Rights Act’s
Mandamus Provision, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 599 (2010) (criticizing the mandamus approach
and calling for broader appellate rights for victims).
317
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 950.10 (West 2010) (“No cause of action for money damages may
arise against the state, any political subdivision of the state or any employee or agent of the
state . . . for any act or omission in the performance of any power or duty under ch. 938 . . . or
under article I, section 9m, of the Wisconsin constitution . . . .”). But see id. § 950.11 (“A
public official . . . that intentionally fails to provide a right specified under [§] 950.04(1v) to a
victim of a crime may be subject to a forfeiture of not more than $1,000.”).
318

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 950.08(3).

319

Id. § 950.04 (“Victims of crimes have the following rights . . . [t]o restitution . . . [t]o
recompense . . . [t]o a judgment for unpaid restitution . . . [t]o compensation . . . .”).
320

Id. § 950.09(2). This forfeiture is allowed for intentional violations of victims’ rights
and cannot exceed $1,000. Id. § 950.11.
321

730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-5-6(m) (West 2010) (“A restitution order . . . is a
judgment lien . . . .”).
322

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-805(C) (West 2010).
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maintain its priority indefinitely.”323 In Florida, “[t]he restitution obligation is not
subject to discharge in bankruptcy.”324
2. Criminal Defendant’s Inability to Pay
Crime victim recovery can also be hampered by a criminal defendant’s
competing financial obligations. Some states prioritize payments to crime victims
over other obligations of the (alleged) criminal. In Iowa, the “court shall provide for
payments in the following order of priority: victim, fines, penalties, and surcharges,
crime victim compensation program reimbursement, public agencies, court costs.”325
In Arizona, the complete satisfaction of a restitution order must occur prior to
payment of other court imposed obligations.326 In Pennsylvania at least half of the
monies collected at sentencing must be applied to restitution for the victim.327 An
Alaska statute says that a “claim by a victim arising out of an order of restitution . . .
or a judgment in a civil action against an offender for damages resulting from a
crime is a superior claim for money that would otherwise be paid to the state.”328
One frequent enforcement mechanism is wage garnishment. This can be pursued
“[u]pon the entry of an order for restitution” as in Florida,329 or in the event of
noncompliance with a crime victim recovery order, as in Arizona where garnishment
comes “[a]fter a hearing on an order to show cause.”330 In Colorado, after an
offender is five days late with a restitution payment, a “collections investigator
may . . . [r]equest that the clerk of the court issue an attachment of earnings.”331
For a wrongdoer without the resources to pay at the time of a recovery order,
some states require that income earned through work release be applied. In Texas,
any salary earned in work release is paid to the sheriff who “shall deposit [it] into a
special fund to be given to the defendant on his release after deducting . . .
restitution.”332 In Pennsylvania, “[t]he county correctional facility . . . or the

323

42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9728(d) (West 2010).

324

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775-089(10)(b) (West 2010).

325

IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.2(1) (West 2010).

326

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-804(K) & 13-809(A) (West 2010).

327

42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9728(g.1) (West 2010).

328

ALASKA. STAT. ANN. § 12.61.020 (b) (West 2010). The Alaskan statute also provides
that the state can collect monies otherwise owed to an offender arising out of reenactments or
offender’s comments about a crime. Id. § 12.61.020 (a).
329
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089(12)(a)(1). See also 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-5-6(h)
(“[t]he judge may enter an order of withholding”).
330

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-812(A).

331

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-18.5-105(3)(b) (West 2010). See also id. § 18-1.3-602(1)
(“‘Collections investigator’ means a person employed by the judicial department whose
primary responsibility is to administer, enforce, and collect on court orders or judgments
entered with respect to fines, fees, restitution, or any other accounts receivable of the court,
judicial district, or judicial department.”).
332

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.031(b)(3) (West 2010).
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Department of Corrections shall be authorized to make monetary deductions from
inmate personal accounts for the purpose of collecting restitution.”333
Some states also statutorily allow for interception of future financial resources.
Arizona provides that “[a]ny monies . . . owed by this state to a person who is under
a restitution order shall be assigned first to discharge the restitution order, including
any tax refund.”334 Maryland speaks to a wrongdoer winning the lottery, requiring
“the State Lottery Agency to withhold the prize and pay it towards the restitution
obligor’s restitution arrearage.”335
Several states, anticipating that a wrongdoer may enter into a “notoriety of
crimes” contract, seek to prevent unjust enrichment. Maryland requires that money
be paid “over to the Attorney General . . . that . . . otherwise would be owed to the
defendant.”336 The Attorney General is then mandated to “deposit money
received . . . in an interest bearing escrow account337 . . . for the benefit of . . . the
victim338 . . . [who] has been awarded restitution.”339
In the event of nonpayment, some states have established specific oversight
duties to assist crime victims. For example, Georgia mandates:
[T]he clerk of court or the probation or parole officer . . . whoever is
responsible for collecting restitution, shall review the case not less
frequently than twice yearly . . . . If it is determined . . . that restitution is
not being paid as ordered, a written report of the violation shall be filed
with the court . . . .340
Alabama mandates a monthly report by the clerk to the prosecutor and probation
office.341 Arizona simply requires the clerk to notify the prosecutor, the court, and
the victim of any default on a restitution order.342
Once a trial court is aware of noncompliance, a hearing is usually held to
determine whether nonpayment was willful. In Colorado, the “collections
investigator may . . . [r]equest that the court issue a notice to show cause requiring
the defendant to appear . . . and show cause why the required . . . payments were not
made.”343 In Maine, an “offender who has . . . defaulted . . . shall be returned to
court for further disposition.”344
333

42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9728(b)(5) (West 2010).

334

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-804(K).

335

MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-618(b)(3) (West 2010).

336

Id. § 11-622(2).

337

Id. § 11-624(a).

338

Id. §11-624(b).

339

Id. §11-624(c)(1)(iii).

340

GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-14(c) (West 2010).

341

ALA. CODE § 15-23-82 (West 2010).

342

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-810(A).

343

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-18.5-105(3)(d) (West 2010). See also id. § 18-1.3-602(1)
(“‘Collections investigator’ means a person employed by the judicial department whose
primary responsibility is to administer, enforce, and collect on court orders or judgments
entered with respect to fines, fees, restitution, or any other accounts receivable of the court,
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Noncompliance caused by financial inability is generally met with leniency. In
Illinois, criminal courts may grant time extensions to those who unintentionally fail
to pay.345 In Maine, “[i]f it appears that the default is excusable, the court may give
the offender additional time for payment or may reduce the amount of each
installment.”346 In Pennsylvania, when there is a default due to lack of resources, the
appropriate authority may “sentence the defendant to a period of community
service.”347 Some have suggested that “[v]ictims can have input into the type and
location of the community service performed.”348
In cases of willful noncompliance with a criminal court sentencing order
involving crime victim recovery, the order is generally enforceable as any civil case
judgment.349 A court may issue a contempt order, extend probation, or order jail
time with or without work release.350 Some states expressly allow probation
revocation for an intentional default.351 In Maryland, “compliance with the judgment
of restitution . . . shall be a condition of work release . . . [and] of probation.”352
G. The Effects of Forfeitures on Crime Victim Recoveries
While recoveries through state supported funds are available to some crime
victims, civil and criminal case recoveries against actual, accused, or alleged
judicial district, or judicial department.”); id. § 16-18.5-104(3)(a) (“Upon referral . . . the
collections investigator shall conduct an investigation into the financial ability of the
defendant to pay the restitution . . . .”).
344

ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1329(1) (West 2010).

345

730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-5-6(i) (West 2010).

346

ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1329(3)(B) (2010).

347

42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9730(b)(3) (West 2010).

348

Office of Justice Programs, Financial Assistance for Victims of Crime, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/assist/nvaa99/chap5-2.htm (last visited March 3, 2011)
(suggestion by Office for Victims of Crime). “The Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) was
established by the 1984 Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) to oversee diverse programs that
benefit victims of crime. OVC provides substantial funding to state victim assistance and
compensation programs . . . [and] supports trainings designed to educate criminal justice and
allied professionals regarding the rights and needs of crime victims.” Office for Victims of
Crime, Welcome to the Office for Victims of Crime, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/welcovc/welcome.html (last visited March 3, 2011).
349
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-18.5-105(3)(c) (“Whenever a defendant fails to
make a payment of restitution within five days after the date that the payment is due . . . in
addition to any other remedy, the collections investigator may . . . (b) Request that the clerk of
the court issue an attachment of earnings requiring that a certain portion . . . be withheld and
applied to any unpaid restitution . . . . An attachment of earnings . . . shall be enforceable in
the same manner as a garnishment in a civil action. . . . (c) Request that the clerk of the court
issue a writ of execution, writ of attachment, or other civil process to collect upon a judgment
. . . .”).
350

See, e.g., id. § 16-18.5-105(3)(d)(I)-(IV).

351

See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.051(a) (West 2010) (where restitution was a
condition of probation); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-804(E) (West 2010).
352

MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-607(a)(1)(ii)-(iii) (West 2010).
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criminals are available to many more victims. Civil cases may proceed before,
during, or after criminal cases. When simultaneously pursued, however, criminal
cases may prompt stays of related civil cases.353 Criminal case recoveries are usually
considered at sentencing.
As actual, accused, or alleged criminals often have only limited assets, crime
victims at times compete with others for access to these assets. Governments claim
direct access through forfeitures and fines.354 Criminals may seek access to retain
legal counsel, to secure medical treatment, or to buy goods. Some state forfeiture
laws expressly disallow funds used for criminal defense.355 The conflicting interests
in accessing the assets of actual, accused, and alleged criminals can be easily
illustrated.

353
See Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 608 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1979) (reversing the
district court’s decision to dismiss a criminal defendant’s libel claim, with a remand ordering
that civil discovery be stayed, upon weighing the civil defendant’s discovery rights and the
criminal defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Armstrong v.
Tanaka, 228 P.3d 79 (Alaska 2010) (employing the weighing test in Wehling to find that a
stay of the civil proceeding was appropriate); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1311(1)(b) (McKinney 2010)
(“An action relating to a pre-conviction forfeiture crime need not be grounded upon
conviction of a pre-conviction forfeiture crime, provided, however, that if the action is not
grounded upon such a conviction, it shall be necessary in the action for the claiming authority
to prove the commission of a pre-conviction forfeiture crime by clear and convincing
evidence. An action under this paragraph shall be stayed during the pendency of a criminal
action which is related to it; provided, that upon motion of a defendant in the forfeiture action
or the claiming authority, a court may, in the interest of justice and for good cause, and with
the consent of all parties, order that the forfeiture action proceed despite the pending criminal
action; and provided that such stay shall not prevent the granting or continuance of any
provisional remedy provided under this article or any other provision of law.”). But see
Morgenthau v. Basbus, 890 N.Y.S.2d 43 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (holding that defendant was
not permitted to stay a civil forfeiture proceeding until the disposition of the defendant’s
appeal of a criminal case conviction, because the appeal in a criminal proceeding is separate
from the criminal action itself that would stay the civil forfeiture proceeding).
354
Not all asset forfeitures arise from criminal acts. See, e.g., People v. Keil, 73 Cal. Rptr.
3d 600 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (five year firearms forfeiture for mental health care patient
who would likely use firearms in unsafe ways).
355

See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/12 (West 2010) (“Nothing in this Act shall apply to
property which constitutes reasonable bona fide attorney’s fees . . . .”); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 54-36h(d) (West 2010) (“Notwithstanding [money or property relating to controlled
substances crimes or money laundering] . . . no moneys or property used or intended to be
used by the owner thereof to pay legitimate attorney’s fees in connection with his defense in a
criminal prosecution shall be subject to forfeiture under this section.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 604106(a)(5)(A) (West 2010) (“An interest in property acquired in good faith by an attorney as
reasonable payment or to secure payment for legal services in a criminal matter relating to
violations of this act or for the reimbursement of reasonable expenses related to the legal
services is exempt from forfeiture unless before the interest was acquired the attorney knew of
a judicial determination of probable cause that the property is subject to forfeiture.”); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 1311(12) (McKinney 2010) (“Property acquired in good faith by an attorney as
payment for the reasonable and bona fide fees of legal services or reimbursement of
reasonable and bona fide expenses related to the representation of a defendant in connection
with a civil or criminal forfeiture proceeding or a related criminal matter, shall be exempt
from a judgment of forfeiture.”).
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Assume a person is allegedly selling illegal drugs from his home, which itself
was not bought with the proceeds from any crime. Assume also that on the day of
one illegal drug deal, the person, upon completing a transaction with a client, robs
the client’s friend who was merely transporting the client with the friend’s car and
who had no idea about any drug deal. The robbery victim likely has remedies that
can access much of the robber’s assets, including his house. The robbery victim
would certainly be entitled to seek return of the actual money stolen, assuming
proper identification.356
Unlike the stolen money, the victim would have to compete with others for
access to the robber’s other assets, like the house. For example, other homeowners
in the same neighborhood as the robber/drug dealer may have suffered from the drug
dealing. Thus, they may have a nuisance suit involving the house available to them.
The robbery victim may also have to compete with the government for access to the
robber/drug dealer’s assets, because the government can often seek the forfeiture of
property used in an illegal transaction.357
The alleged drug dealer also has an interest in accessing his own house and the
alleged stolen money, at least until a crime has been proven. While this person may
not be able to easily use the stolen money or drug trafficking proceeds in retaining
legal counsel, other property, like the house, can be more easily used.
The government and private parties other than crime victims may claim the
different assets of actual, accused, and alleged criminals. Forfeitures to governments
of certain assets are authorized under both federal and state laws. Under federal
statutes, there can be civil in rem forfeitures and criminal forfeitures.358 Similar
forfeitures are typically available under state statutes. Moreover, in some states
there can be administrative and civil in personam forfeitures.
Under federal statute, property used in a crime may be seized through a civil in
rem forfeiture.359 Unlike a criminal forfeiture,360 conviction is not a necessary
element. Thus, as with firearm forfeitures, acquittals may not result in the return of
seized property.361
356

The victim, in some circumstances, may have to compete with the government for the
victim’s own stolen money. For instance, federal law authorizes the federal government to
seize “substitute assets” in place of forfeitable assets that cannot be located, are beyond the
jurisdiction of the court, or have been sold or given to a third party. 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(p)
(West 2010) (“substitute assets” include assets that have been commingled with other property
that cannot easily be divided). See also United States v. Alamoudi, 452 F.3d 310, 315 (4th
Cir. 2006) (“[A]n order authorizing forfeiture of substitute assets pursuant to § 853(p) does
not” require a jury determination because it does not at all increase the amount of forfeiture.).
357
Von Hofe v. United States, 492 F.3d 175, 179 (2d Cir. 2007) (Where the state
government filed criminal drug charges against the defendants, the federal government,
instead of filing criminal charges, filed a civil in rem forfeiture proceeding against the
defendants’ house, where approximately sixty five potted marijuana plants had been found).
358

18 U.S.C.A. § 981 (West 2010).

359

Id.

360
21 U.S.C.A. § 853(a) (West 2010) (“Any person convicted of a violation . . . punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year shall forfeit to the United States . . . .”).
361

See 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(d)(1) (“Any firearm or ammunition involved in or used in any
knowing violation of subsection (a)(4), (a)(6), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), or (k) of section 922
[regarding unlawful acts involving firearms] . . . shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture . . .
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In a state civil in rem forfeiture proceeding, property may be seized pending the
disposition of a related criminal action; if a person is not convicted, a civil in rem
forfeiture may still proceed.362 If a person is criminally convicted, issue preclusion
can operate.363
Some state statutes also provide for civil in personam forfeitures.364 Unlike civil
in rem proceedings, where only property involved in criminal conduct is subject to
forfeiture,365 civil in personam proceedings may involve the forfeitures of assets
unrelated to illegal conduct.366
Provided, That upon acquittal of the owner or possessor, or dismissal of the charges against
him other than upon motion of the Government prior to trial, or lapse of or court termination
of the restraining order to which he is subject, the seized or relinquished firearms or
ammunition shall be returned forthwith to the owner or possessor . . . unless the return of the
firearms or ammunition would place the owner or possessor . . . in violation of the law.”);
United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 366 (1984) (“Congress in fact
drafted § 924(d) to cover a broader range of conduct than is proscribed by the criminal
provisions of § 922(a)(1) . . . . Because the sanction embodied in § 924(d) is not limited to
criminal misconduct, the forfeiture remedy cannot be said to be co-extensive with the criminal
penalty. What overlap there is between the two sanctions is not sufficient to persuade us that
the forfeiture proceeding may not legitimately be viewed as civil in nature . . . . We
accordingly conclude that the forfeiture mechanism set forth in § 924(d) is not an additional
penalty for the commission of a criminal act, but rather a separate civil sanction, remedial in
nature. . . . We hold that a gun owner’s acquittal on criminal charges involving firearms does
not preclude a subsequent in rem forfeiture proceeding against those firearms under §
924(d).”); United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 872 (3d Cir. 1987) (“Civil forfeiture is an in
rem proceeding. . . . The innocence of the owner is irrelevant—it is enough that the property
was involved in a violation to which forfeiture attaches.”).
362
See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-49(v) (West 2010) (“An acquittal or dismissal in a criminal
proceeding does not preclude civil proceedings under this [forfeiture] article.”); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 712A-11(6) (West 2010) (“An acquittal or dismissal in a criminal proceeding shall not
preclude civil proceedings under this [forfeiture] chapter.”). However, in some jurisdictions,
an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal action can force the dismissal of the related forfeiture
action. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-13-307(1.6) (West 2010) (“Upon acquittal or dismissal of
a criminal action against a person named in a forfeiture action related to the criminal action,
unless the forfeiture action was brought pursuant to one or more of paragraphs (a) to (f) of
subsection (1.7) [which includes a defendant’s deferred sentence, or the defendant waiving the
conviction requirement, among others], the forfeiture action shall be dismissed . . . .”); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.460(2) (West 2010) (“Following conviction . . . the court shall
conduct an ancillary hearing to forfeit property if requested by any party other than the
defendant or Commonwealth.”).
363
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-49(r) (West 2010) (“A defendant convicted in any
criminal proceeding is precluded from later denying the essential allegations of the criminal
offense of which the defendant was convicted . . . . [A] conviction results from a verdict or
plea of guilty, including a plea of nolo contendere.”).
364
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4312(A) (West 2010) (“If a forfeiture is authorized by
law, it shall be ordered by a court on proceedings by the state in an in personam civil or
criminal action . . . .”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4114 (West 2010) (“If a forfeiture is authorized
by this act, it shall be ordered by the court in the in personam action. The action shall be in
addition to or in lieu of in rem forfeiture procedures.”).
365

HAW. REV. STAT. § 712A-12(9) (“In accordance with its findings at the [forfeiture]
hearing, the court shall order an interest in property returned or conveyed to the claimant, if
any, who has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant’s interest is not
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In both federal and state proceedings, in rem forfeitures can be either challenged
or unchallenged. Forfeitures go unchallenged when no one steps up to claim
ownership in the assets seized.367 Generally, states require there that there be a
judicial determination before a challenged forfeiture is declared final.368 However, a
judicial determination is not always required before an unchallenged forfeiture.369
Unchallenged forfeitures that do not require judicial determinations are typically
considered “administrative forfeitures.”370 Not to be confused with the quasi-judicial
actions of administrative agencies, administrative forfeiture occurs when a law
enforcement agency declares assets legally forfeited without a judicial
determination.371 An unchallenged forfeiture, that is, one to which there is no
objection raised, does not necessarily result in an administrative forfeiture. Some
states require a judicial determination in certain instances of asset forfeiture even
when no objections are filed.372
subject to forfeiture. The court shall order all other property, including all interests in the
property, forfeited to the State . . . .”).
366
See id. § 712A-14 (“The court shall order the forfeiture of any other property of an in
personam civil or criminal defendant up to the value of the subject property if any of the
property subject to forfeiture . . . [c]annot be located . . . [or] [h]as been transferred or
conveyed to, sold to, or deposited with a third party . . . .”).
367

See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/6(C)(1) (West 2010) (“Any person claiming
an interest in property . . . may . . . file a verified claim with the State’s Attorney expressing
his or her interest in the property.”).
368
DEE R. EDGEWORTH, ASSET FORFEITURE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 35 (2d ed. 2008) (“[N]onjudicial forfeiture does not have widespread use
within the state forfeiture system.”).
369

See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 712A-10(11) (“In the event a claim and bond has not been
filed in substantial compliance with this section, or if the attorney general, with sole
discretion, determines that remission or mitigation is not warranted, the attorney general shall
order forfeited all property seized for forfeiture.”). But see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134309(B) (“If the state fails to initiate forfeiture proceedings against property seized . . . such
property shall be released from its seizure for forfeiture on the request of an owner or interest
holder . . . .”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/6 (West 2010) (“If no claim is filed . . . the State’s
Attorney shall declare the property forfeited . . . .”).
370

EDGEWORTH, supra note 368, at 3 (“Administrative forfeiture entails forfeiture of
property without formal court action.”).
371

Id.

372

Compare, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 17.30.116(b)-(c) (West 2010) (“Upon service or
publication of notice of commencement of a forfeiture action under this section, a person
claiming interest in the property shall file within 30 days after the service or publication, a
notice of claim setting out the nature of the interest, the date it was acquired, the consideration
paid, and an answer to the state’s allegations. If a claim and answer is not filed within the
time specified, the property described in the state’s allegation must be ordered forfeited to the
state without further proceedings or showings . . . . Questions of fact or law raised by a notice
of forfeiture action and answer of a claimant in an action commenced under this section must
be determined by the court sitting without a jury.”), and MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-29-176(6)
(West 2010) (“If no petition to contest forfeiture is timely filed, the attorney for the seizing
law enforcement agency shall prepare a written declaration of forfeiture of the subject
property and the forfeited property shall be used, distributed or disposed of . . . .”), with ARIZ.
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Thus, some uncontested forfeitures must be judicially approved. Additionally,
some states require judicial determinations when the value of seized assets exceeds a
certain monetary amount.373 Monetary amounts range from $10,000 in Mississippi374
to $500,000 at the federal level.375 A judicial determination is also mandated at
times when the seized asset is real property.376
At the state level, the civil forfeiture of a criminal’s assets can assist in
compensating a crime victim. For example, in Arizona a victim may apply to the
government for compensation from the defendant’s forfeited assets prior to final
judgment.377 In this situation the victim must state under penalty of perjury, inter
alia, the nature of the economic loss,378 the supporting facts,379 and the requested
amount.380 Upon request, the court “shall hold a hearing to establish whether there is
a factual basis for the request.”381 The burden is on the victim to establish “by a
preponderance of the evidence” that he or she “is an injured person who sustained
economic loss.”382 If the government can show by a preponderance of the evidence
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4314(A) (“If no petitions for remission or mitigation or claims are
timely filed or if no petitioner files a claim in the court within thirty days after mailing of a
declaration of forfeiture, the attorney for the state shall apply to the court for an order of
forfeiture and allocation of forfeited property. . . . On the state’s written application showing
jurisdiction, notice and facts sufficient to demonstrate probable cause for forfeiture . . . the
court shall order the property forfeited to the state.”).
373
See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-29-176(1), (6) (“When any property other than a
controlled substance, raw material or paraphernalia, the value of which does not exceed Ten
Thousand Dollars ($10,000), is seized under the Uniform Controlled Substances Law, the
property may be forfeited by the administrative forfeiture procedures provided for in this
section . . . . If no petition to contest forfeiture is timely filed, the attorney for the seizing law
enforcement agency shall prepare a written declaration of forfeiture of the subject property
and the forfeited property shall be used, distributed or disposed of . . . .”).
374

Id. § 41-29-176(1).

375

19 U.S.C.A. § 1607 (West 2010). See also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/6 (“If nonreal property that exceeds $20,000 in value excluding the value of any conveyance, or if real
property is seized . . . the State’s Attorney shall institute judicial in rem forfeiture proceedings
. . . .”).
376

See 18 U.S.C.A. § 985(a) (West 2010); EDGEWORTH, supra note 368, at 36 (“Neither the
state nor the federal systems permit the forfeiture of real property administratively.”). But see
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 150/6(D), (C)(2) (“If no claim is filed . . . the State’s Attorney
shall declare the property forfeited”; however, “if a claimant files the claim . . . then the
State’s Attorney shall institute judicial in rem forfeiture proceeding.”).
377
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4311(I) (“An injured person may submit a request for
compensation from forfeited property to the court at any time before the earlier of the entry of
a final judgment or an application for an order of the forfeiture of the property, or if a
hearing . . . is held, not less than thirty days before the hearing.”).
378

Id. § 13-4311(I)(4).

379

Id. § 13-4311(I)(5).

380

Id. § 13-4311(I)(7).

381

Id. § 13-4311(J).

382

Id.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010

51

870

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:819

that the property is subject to forfeiture,383 and the court finds that the “requestor is
an injured person,”384 the court then “shall determine the amount of the injured
person’s economic loss caused by the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture of the
designated property.”385 As long as the property is “not contraband and is not altered
or designed for use in conduct giving rise to forfeiture,” the State’s Attorney “shall
sell the property” and “shall apply the resulting balance to compensate the injured
person’s economic loss in the amount found by the court.”386 In the event that there
is insufficient money from the sale to compensate all victims, the money is
distributed among victims at the court’s discretion.387 In the event that there is a
surplus, “the attorney for the state shall transmit ten per cent of the remaining
balance . . . to the Arizona criminal justice commission for deposit in the victim
compensation and assistance fund.”388
Federal statutes also provide for criminal forfeitures of certain assets.389 A
federal criminal forfeiture proceeding is an in personam proceeding while a federal
civil forfeiture proceeding is an in rem proceeding. Unlike in civil in rem
forfeitures, the property holder in federal criminal in personam forfeiture
proceedings must first be convicted of a related offense.390
One benefit of a
criminal forfeiture case is its broader scope. A criminal forfeiture order can be
entered as a money judgment, a judgment against specific property, or a judgment
against substitute assets.391 Because a criminal forfeiture is part of a criminal case
383

See, e.g., id. § 13-4311(M) (“At the hearing, the state has the burden of establishing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture under section 13-4304
. . . .”); id. § 13-4304 (“all property, including all interest in such property, described in a
statute providing for its forfeiture is subject to forfeiture”). Exemptions from forfeiture are
found at id. § 13-4304(1)-(5).
384

Id. § 13-4311(N)(3).

385

Id.

386

Id. § 13-4311(N)(3)(a).

387

Id. § 13-4311(N)(3)(b).

388

Id. § 13-4311(N)(3)(c). See also id. § 13-4311(N)(3)(d) (“the attorney for the state shall
deposit the remainder of the balance, if any, in an appropriate anti-racketeering revolving
fund”).
389

18 U.S.C.A. § 982(a)(1) (West 2010) (“The court, in imposing sentence on a person
convicted . . . shall order that the person forfeit to the United States any property, real or
personal, involved in such offense, or any property traceable to such property.”). See also 21
U.S.C.A. § 853 (West 2010) (drug forfeiture); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963 (RICO offenses).
390

FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) (“As soon as practical after a verdict or finding of guilty,
or after a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is accepted, on any count in an indictment or
information regarding which criminal forfeiture is sought, the court must determine what
property is subject to forfeiture under the applicable statute.”).
391
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(a) (in authorizing forfeiture under RICO offenses, “[w]hoever
violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned . . . or both, and shall forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any provision of
State law . . . (1) any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of section
1962; (2) any (A) interest in; (B) security of; (C) claim against; or (D) property or contractual
right of any kind affording a source of influence over; any enterprise which the person
established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of
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sentence, it does not prompt a new case. Unlike the conviction itself, the criminal
forfeiture order can be based on a preponderance of the evidence.392 Typically, the
government must state in the indictment that it intends to seek criminal forfeiture at
any later sentencing.393 The federal government can first seize assets in a civil in
rem forfeiture and then move those assets into a criminal forfeiture proceeding upon
conviction.394
Under federal statute, after a guilty verdict or guilty plea, a criminal court judge
can determine what assets listed in the indictment may be forfeited.395 If third parties
seek access to the same assets, a hearing is required. This hearing is usually held by
the same judge who presided over the criminal case.396
When relevant assets have not yet been seized during a civil in rem forfeiture
proceeding, under federal statute the government can seek interlocutory relief as to

section 1962; and (3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the
person obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity or unlawful debt collection
in violation of section 1962”); id. § 1963(b) (“Property subject to criminal forfeiture under this
section includes (1) real property, including things growing on, affixed to, and found in land;
and (2) tangible and intangible personal property, including rights, privileges, interests,
claims, and securities.”); id. §1963(m) (“If any of the property described in subsection (a), as a
result of any act or omission of the defendant (1) cannot be located upon the exercise of due
diligence; (2) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party; (3) has been
placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court; (4) has been substantially diminished in value; or
(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided without difficulty; the
court shall order the forfeiture of any other property of the defendant up to the value of any
property described in paragraphs (1) through (5).”).
392

See United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1082 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Cherry,
330 F.3d 658, 669-70 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 42 (1995));
United States v. Myers, 21 F.3d 826, 831 (8th Cir. 1994). In some state cases, a criminal
forfeiture action must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §
186.5(d) (West 2010). Elsewhere, proof by a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient.
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-708(d) (West 2010).
393

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(a); United States v. Grammatikos, 633 F.2d 1013, 1024 (2d
Cir. 1980).
394

EDGEWORTH, supra note 368, at 186 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(a)(3)(B) (West 2010)).

395

FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) (“As soon as practical after a verdict or finding of guilty,
or after a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is accepted, on any count in an indictment or
information regarding which criminal forfeiture is sought, the court must determine what
property is subject to forfeiture under the applicable statute. If the government seeks
forfeiture of specific property, the court must determine whether the government has
established the requisite nexus between the property and the offense. If the government seeks
a personal money judgment, the court must determine the amount of money that the defendant
will be ordered to pay.”).
396

FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(c)(1) (“If . . . a third party files a petition asserting an interest in
the property to be forfeited, the court must conduct an ancillary proceeding, but no ancillary
proceeding is required to the extent that the forfeiture consists of a money judgment.”). See
also United States v. Lazarenko, 610 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that
bona fide purchaser status, achieved before criminal conduct occurred, can outweigh
government’s forfeiture interest in same property).
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the assets, including a temporary injunction.397 Such a request for relief can be made
when a civil in rem forfeiture complaint is filed.398 After an opportunity for hearing,
interlocutory relief can be ordered if “there is substantial probability that the United
States will prevail on the issue of forfeiture and . . . failure to enter the order will
result in the property being destroyed, removed from the jurisdiction of the court, or
otherwise be made unavailable for forfeiture”399 and if “the need to preserve the
availability of the property through the entry of the requested order outweighs the
hardship on any party against whom the order is to be entered.”400 Interlocutory
relief can be granted to the government without notice under certain
circumstances.401
Some states also permit interlocutory relief in civil in rem forfeiture
proceedings.402 Such relief may even come in the form of a sale of an asset after
notice is given should it be found that the asset will significantly depreciate in value
if not sold.403

397

18 U.S.C.A. § 983(j)(1) (West 2010) (“Upon application of the United States, the court
may enter a restraining order or injunction, require the execution of satisfactory performance
bonds, create receiverships, appoint conservators, custodians, appraisers, accountants, or
trustees, or take any other action to seize, secure, maintain, or preserve the availability of
property subject to civil forfeiture . . . .”).
398

18 U.S.C.A. § 983(j)(1)(A).

399

Id. § 983(j)(1)(B)(i).

400

Id. § 983(j)(1)(B)(ii).

401

Id. § 983(j)(3) (“A temporary restraining order under this subsection may be entered
upon application of the United States without notice or opportunity for a hearing when a
complaint has not yet been filed with respect to the property, if the United States demonstrates
that there is probable cause to believe that the property with respect to which the order is
sought is subject to civil forfeiture and that provision of notice will jeopardize the availability
of the property for forfeiture. Such a temporary order shall not expire not more than 14 days
after the date on which it is entered, unless extended for good cause shown or unless the party
against whom it is entered consents to an extension for a longer period.”).
402

See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4312(D) (West 2010) (“[A] temporary restraining order
under this section may be entered on application of the state without notice or an opportunity
for a hearing if the state demonstrates both that . . . [t]here is probable cause to believe that the
property with respect to which the order is sought would, in the event of final judgment or
conviction, be subject to forfeiture under this title [and] [p]rovision of notice will jeopardize
the availability of the property for forfeiture. A temporary restraining order expires within ten
days after the date on which it is entered unless the party against whom it is entered consents
to an extension for a longer period or unless after commencing a hearing the court enters or is
considering a preliminary injunction.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4114(b) (West 2010) (“The
court may issue a temporary restraining order in an action under this section on application of
the plaintiff’s attorney, without notice or an opportunity for a hearing, if the plaintiff’s
attorney demonstrates that . . . [t]here is probable cause to believe that in the event of a final
judgment, the property involved would be subject to forfeiture under the provisions of this act;
and . . . [a] provision of notice would jeopardize the availability of the property for
forfeiture.”).
403

See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 17.30.120 (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.7
(West 2010).
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A restraining order against the use of assets that may be forfeited can interfere
with the owner’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In Caplin & Drysdale, Charted
v. United States, a criminal defendant allegedly dealt in illegal drugs.404 The trial
court entered a restraining order preventing the defendant from transferring any
assets listed in the indictment that could be subject to a later criminal forfeiture.405
The defendant moved to allow some of the assets to be used to pay counsel, but then
pled guilty before any hearing.406 Part of the plea agreement involved forfeiture of
all the assets listed in the indictment.407 The listed assets in the forfeiture order
included “virtually all assets,” including real estate and $200,000 in U.S. currency.408
Because of the plea, the trial court denied the motion.409 The defendant’s attorney
then requested that the court set aside a portion of the forfeited assets, arguing that
assets used for attorney’s fees should be exempt from forfeiture.410 If they were not,
the attorney argued that the statute would be in violation of the Sixth Amendment.411
The trial court granted the request but the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed.412
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “a defendant has no Sixth Amendment
right to spend another person’s money for services rendered by an attorney, even if
those funds are the only way that the defendant will be able to retain the attorney of
his choice.”413
While there may be no Sixth Amendment interest when the government secures
assets in advance of any fee issue, right to counsel issues can arise when the
government seizes assets that are unconnected to criminal conduct and are needed to
pay counsel. In United States v. Farmer, U.S. Customs agents seized a criminal
defendant’s cars and other assets, including about $540,000, believing the items
404

Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 619 (1989).

405

Id. at 620. The forfeiture in this case was sought under the criminal forfeiture statute for
acts in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 848 (West 2010) (continuing criminal enterprise charges,
which were later held to be repealed by implication in United States v. Stitt, 552 F.3d 345, 352
(4th Cir. 2008)).
406

Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 621.

407

Id.

408

Id. at 620-21.

409

Id. at 621.

410

21 U.S.C.A. § 853(c) (West 2010) (providing for forfeiture to the government even
when the defendant had previously transferred to a third party, unless the transferee can
establish that he was a bona fide purchaser of the property in question).
411

Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 623-24.

412

Id. at 622.

413

Id. at 626. In the plurality opinion of the court, Justice White hypothesized that a bank
robber would not be able to use the proceeds of his theft of the bank’s money to retain an
attorney, as the defendant is not the rightful owner of the funds. Id. Justice White also
believed that the defense attorney would be ethically barred from accepting stolen property, as
an attorney would not be allowed to accept instrumentalities of a crime as payment from a
criminal defendant, such as stolen property, as payment for legal services. Id. (“‘The privilege
to practice law is not a license to steal.’” (quoting Laska v. United States, 82 F.2d 672, 677
(10th Cir. 1936))).
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were connected to counterfeiting.414 In the two years that followed, the defendant
twice unsuccessfully moved to have the assets returned through the pendency of the
criminal investigation.415 A civil forfeiture action was never commenced.416 An
indictment was finally issued, which included an action for criminal forfeiture of the
seized assets.417 The criminal defendant then moved for a hearing, seeking release of
some of the seized funds so that he could pay an attorney.418 He claimed that the
seizure effectively put him out of business and that at least some of the assets were
unrelated to any alleged crimes.419 The appellate court, citing Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered v. United States, stated that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
supports an individual’s “right to spend his own legitimate, nonforfeitable assets”
even though crime proceeds cannot be used to retain defense counsel.420 The court
reasoned that while it is “clear that there is no Sixth Amendment right for a
defendant to obtain counsel using tainted funds,” a criminal defendant “still
possesses a qualified Sixth Amendment right to use wholly legitimate funds to hire
the attorney of his choice.”421 The Farmer court held that due process demanded
that the defendant be able to challenge the seizure of the assets because of the
defendant’s significant interest in obtaining a pretrial hearing regarding allegedly
unrelated funds, the high risk of “erroneous deprivation” of the defendant’s interest
in the absence of any hearing, and lack of an undue burden on the government.422
Thus, forfeiture laws allow governments to seize only assets tied to alleged
criminal acts. It appears there could be a Sixth Amendment issue in a civil suit
paralleling a criminal proceeding when a crime victim seeks to preserve a criminal
defendant’s assets that are unconnected to alleged criminal acts. Thus, a criminal
defendant’s assets that are unrelated to the alleged criminal acts may be unavailable
for the purpose of securing later crime victim recovery. However, in Manning v.
Manning, the Georgia Supreme Court held that a civil plaintiff’s temporary
injunction against a criminal defendant’s assets does not violate the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel when that defendant’s assets, though unrelated to
criminal acts, were already the subject of an earlier judicial order.423 There, the
criminal defendant and the victim were divorced.424 Under the terms of the divorce,

414

United States v. Farmer, 274 F.3d 800, 801 (4th Cir. 2001).

415

Id. The investigation appeared to have lasted nearly two years without an indictment
filed. Id.
416

Id.

417

Id. at 801-02.

418

Id.

419

Id. at 802.

420

Id. at 802-03 (citing Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617
(1989)).
421

Id. at 804.

422

Id. at 804-06.

423

Manning v. Manning, 508 S.E.2d 157 (Ga. 1998).

424

Id. at 158.
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the defendant was required to transfer certain assets to the victim.425 At the time of
the victim’s death in 1995 at the hands of the ex-husband/criminal defendant, some
of the designated assets still had not been transferred.426 The administrator of the
victim’s estate sued for wrongful death, seeking an injunction against the criminal
defendant’s removal of those assets.427 The trial court granted the injunction,
freezing all of the defendant’s assets and ordering the defendant to separate his
property and to transfer certain property to the estate of the victim.428 The Georgia
Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the injunction was not made for the purpose
of freezing assets to secure remedies that might be awarded to the victim’s estate.429
Rather, it was to prevent disposal of assets already belonging to the victim’s
estate.430 The high court held that there were no Sixth Amendment problems
because the assets were not rightfully in the possession of the criminal defendant.431
A very different issue arises when non-obligated assets are sought postindictment
to secure later crime victim recovery. No issue would arise, however, when the
seizure of some assets would not impair a defendant’s access to counsel of choice
because he or she has sufficient other assets. A crime victim might attempt to avoid
Sixth Amendment issues by bringing civil actions with judgments that are related to
specific property before criminal charges are filed.
IV. SECURING BETTER MONETARY RECOVERIES FOR CRIME VICTIMS
Crime victims often have both constitutional and statutory recovery rights.
Recoveries may be available from the criminal perpetrators, whether or not charged,
or from the government. Recoveries are available in three settings: civil claims,
administrative or special court proceedings, and criminal cases. Too often,
recoveries are difficult to secure and judgments are difficult to enforce. This is
especially troubling where recovery rights are constitutionally-recognized and selfexecuting. There may be ways in which crime victim recoveries can be better
facilitated without infringing upon the rights of the criminally accused.
With recoveries available in civil, administrative or special court, and criminal
settings, crime victims can be confused about their recovery options. Without
altering existing guidelines, all recovery options should generally be presented
together somewhere, or at least cross-referenced. Handbooks on crime victim rights,
including possible recovery avenues, should always be distributed to victims of
significant crimes. Websites outlining possible options should be established and
publicized.
Recovery avenues also differ significantly among states, which adds to the
confusion. Variations exist on such important issues as who is a victim, how much a
victim may recover, from whom a victim may recover, and how recovery orders are
425

Id.

426

Id.

427

Id.

428

Id.

429

Id.

430

Id.

431

Id. (citing Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 626).
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enforced. While interstate differences are inevitable and not in themselves
particularly troublesome, some state crime victim recovery avenues are simply
inadequate. Especially troublesome are schemes failing to deliver on state
constitutional promises. Inadequate state laws in one state can be rectified, often
easily, by following successful approaches employed by other states.
Another option to improve crime victim recovery is encouraging, if not
obligating, more trial judges in state criminal cases to consider crime victim
recoveries, especially when entertaining proposed plea agreements. In federal
district courts and many state courts, assigned trial judges are prohibited from
participating in discussions leading to possible plea agreements.432 Trial judges,
however, must typically address criminal defendants in open court before accepting
guilty pleas.433 At times, judges must inform the defendants of the judicial authority
to order restitution and of possible forfeiture.434 But in Arizona, a trial judge may
only accept a “tendered negotiated plea” after “considering the victim’s view.”435
Other states should follow Arizona by expressly requiring that pleas be conditioned
on judicial consideration of possible crime victim recoveries. The jurisdictional
powers of major state trial courts present fewer barriers to more complete hearings
than exist for the federal district courts,436 as the former often have state
constitutional authority over all justiciable matters while the latter are constrained by
Congressional acts.437

432

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c) (“The court must not participate in [plea agreement]
discussions.”); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 25.3(a) (“The judge shall not participate in plea
discussions.”). But see ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 17.4(a) (“At the request of either party, or sua
sponte, the court may, in its sole discretion, participate in settlement discussions . . . . The
trial judge shall only participate . . . with the consent of the parties. In all other cases, the
discussions shall be before another judge or a settlement division.”).
433

FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b) (“Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the
defendant may be placed under oath, and the court must address the defendant personally in
open court.”); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 24.4 (“The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere from a defendant without first addressing the defendant personally . . . .”); ARIZ. R.
CRIM. P. 17.2 (“Before accepting a plea of guilty or no contest, the court shall address the
defendant personally in open court . . . .”).
434

See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(J)-(K); N.D. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(I) (“The court may
not accept a plea of guilty without first, by addressing the defendant . . . in open court,
informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands . . . the court’s
authority to order restitution.”). But see CONN. SUP. CT. R. § 39-19 (no information on either
restitution or forfeiture must be conveyed); PA. CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL RULES COMM.,
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO PA. RS. CRIM. P. 550 (PLEAS OF GUILTY BEFORE MAGISTERIAL
DISTRICT JUDGE IN COURT CASES) AND 590 (PLEAS AND PLEA AGREEMENTS) (2009) (requiring
admonishments to the defendant about fines, but not about restitution or forfeiture).
435

ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 17.4(d). See also id. at 7.4(a) (Before any plea discussions, “the
prosecutor shall afford the victim an opportunity to confer with the prosecutor concerning a
non-trial or non-jury trial resolution.”).
436
In considering all related harms, state trial judges need not resolve all controversies.
Rather, they should employ discretionary factors, not unlike those used with federal district
court supplemental jurisdictional, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West 2010).
437

Compare ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9, with U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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In other words, criminal trial judges should usually only accept pleas when
assured that crime victims were educated about possible recoveries. Where state
constitutional interests exist, possible crime victim recoveries should be considered
in even greater detail. Such considerations might include whether hearings are
needed, perhaps with juries, on disputed facts related to recoveries.438 It seems that
these hearings would be conducted under different procedures in different states,
given, for example, the differences in state constitutional civil jury trial rights.439
Whether or not based upon a plea agreement, at sentencing a criminal defendant
typically has no constitutional right to a jury determination of disputes over crime
victim recoveries.440
Furthermore, priority should be given to victims over competing governmental
claims to a property, especially where there are strong state constitutional or
statutory crime victim recovery interests. The California policy, recognizing crime
victim priority in the distribution of property subject to forfeiture, should be broadly
followed.441
There should also be provisional remedies available that help assure the later
availability of assets for crime victim recoveries. Remedies should be available in a
related civil suit or as a supplemental matter in a criminal case.442 States should
follow the Pennsylvania policy allowing prosecutors to seek a “temporary restraining
order” where “there is probable cause to believe that the property with respect to
which the order is sought appears to be necessary to satisfy an anticipated restitution
438

The need to resolve disputed factual issues related to possible federal court recoveries
could prompt jury trial rights. See Cassell Testimony, supra note 115, at 18-19 (analyzing
federal criminal and civil trial jury rights).
439

The federal constitutional civil jury trial right is inapplicable in state court proceedings.
Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875). State civil juries often operate quite differently than
federal civil juries. See N.D. CONST. art. I, § 13 (“All verdicts must be unanimous.”); OHIO
CONST. art. I, § 5 (civil case juries with three-fourths majority may be legislatively
authorized); PA. CONST. art. I, § 6 (civil case juries with five-sixths majority may be
legislatively authorized).
440

See In re State ex rel. T.L.B., 218 P.3d 534, 537-38 (Okla. Civ. App. 2009) (holding
that a denial of a jury trial on the matter of restitution did not violate the Sixth Amendment, as
restitution is not an additional punishment and the Seventh Amendment was not violated as
restitution in a criminal case is an equitable proceeding and not a suit at common law, and that
the jury right provided under the Oklahoma Constitution was not violated because restitution
is an equitable remedy and not an independent civil proceeding); Illinois v. Lowe, 606 N.E.2d
1167, 1172-73 (Ill. 1992) (holding that criminal defendant did not have a right to a jury trial
on the matter of restitution, though other process rights are afforded the defendant in disputes
about restitution at sentencing).
441

CAL. PENAL CODE §502.01(g)(1) (West 2010) (“If the defendant is found to have the
only valid interest in the property subject to forfeiture, it shall be distributed as follows . . . .
First, to the victim, if the victim elects to take the property as full or partial restitution for
injury, victim expenditures, or compensatory damages . . . .”).
442

Professor Cassell has urged that “Congress should adopt legislation giving courts
greater power, at the request of prosecutors, to secure assets that could be used to reimburse
victims for their losses from federal crimes,” after reviewing a General Accounting Office
study showing that after crimes and before criminal court judgments, “criminals . . .
commonly dissipate their criminal gains quickly and in an untraceable manner.” Cassell
Testimony, supra note 115, at 25-26.
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order.”443 In California, the “prosecuting agency” can seek to “prevent dissipation or
secreting of assets or property” any time during a criminal case.444 Typically, state
criminal court judges have jurisdictional authority over what amounts to civil case
provisional remedies. Both civil and criminal adjudicatory powers are vested in the
same trial judges in most major American state trial courts. As a result, in general
jurisdiction state trial courts criminal contempt proceedings typically can be initiated
in civil cases for civil litigation misconduct. Similarly, settlements between crime
victims and criminal defendants in criminal cases should be able to resolve many
related civil claims.
Another proposal for improvement is a more clearly defined role of the
prosecutor in assisting the crime victim to recover in criminal cases. As suggested
by Oregon’s Restitution Task Force, written policies and procedures, reviews by
supervising attorneys, and performance reviews will greatly assist crime victims.445
A crime victim often has an opportunity to recover for crime-related losses during a
criminal case. Yet the role of the victim in the criminal proceeding, and thus the
chance for recovery, is often too limited. In Arizona, for example, a crime victim
has a constitutional446 and statutory447 interest in restitution in a criminal case.
However, the victim may not direct the prosecution to go forward with a criminal
proceeding.448 This seems right. But when there is a criminal case with
443

42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9728(f) (West 2010). See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.532
(West 2010) (prosecutors can obtain an order directed to a financial institution to freeze the
assets of an accused felon for the purpose of ensuring restitution to the victims when there is
probable cause that the account holder was involved in the commission of the felony and
when the loss is $10,000 or more); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-601(1) (West 2010) (“Prior to
or at the time a criminal information, indictment charging a violation, or a petition alleging
delinquency is filed, or at any time during the prosecution of the case, a prosecutor may, if in
the prosecutor’s best judgment there is a substantial likelihood that a conviction will be
obtained and restitution will be ordered in the case, petition the court to . . . (a) enter a
temporary restraining order, an injunction, or both; (b) require the execution of a satisfactory
performance bond; or (c) take any other action to preserve the availability of property which
may be necessary to satisfy an anticipated restitution order.”); id. § 77-38a-601(2)(a) (“[T]he
court may take action as requested by the prosecutor if the court determines: (i) there is
probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the defendant committed
it, and that failure to enter the order will likely result in the property being sold, distributed,
exhausted, destroyed, or removed from the jurisdiction of the court, or otherwise be made
unavailable for restitution . . . .”).
444

CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.11(e)(2).

445

See AUDIT, supra note 291, at 9.

446

ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1 (“[A] victim of crime has a right . . . [t]o be present . . . [t]o
confer with the prosecution . . . [t]o receive prompt restitution . . . .”).
447

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4438 (West 2010) (“In order to assure that any victim . . .
has been advised of the victim’s constitutional rights . . . a judge . . . shall make the following
statement: . . . you are advised that you have rights . . . that, among others, include [the right]
to be present at court proceedings . . . and to receive restitution from a person who is
convicted of causing your loss.”).
448
Id. § 13-441(c) (“The right of the victim to confer with the prosecuting attorney does
not include the authority to direct the prosecution of the case.”). See also ALA. CODE § 15-2366 (West 2010) (“The rights of the victim do not include the authority to direct the
prosecution of the case.”).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss4/5

60

2010]

MONETARY RECOVERIES FOR STATE CRIME VICTIM

879

compensable harm to a victim, the crime victim may not always be able to pursue
recovery easily, even when armed with statutory, if not constitutional, authority.449
Some states create separate causes of action for willful failures by government to
ensure crime victim rights.450 Other states expressly declare that a crime victim does
not have a claim involving any such failures.451 While a victim should not have the
449
See Simmons v. Florida, 974 So.2d 531 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (even with proof of 34
stolen ladders, a defendant charged with stealing two ladders cannot be sentenced to pay for
the other 32; no discussion of possible ancillary jurisdiction); AUDIT, supra note 291, at 9
(“For example, some district attorneys have chosen not to prosecute certain crimes such as
misdemeanor thefts. Consequently, victims of these crimes are not entitled to restitution and
may never be compensated for their losses.”).
450
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4437(A)-(B) (“The victim has standing to seek an
order, to bring a special action or to file a notice of appearance in an appellate proceeding
seeking to enforce any right or to challenge an order denying any right guaranteed to victims
under the victims’ bill of rights, article II, § 2.1 . . . . In asserting any right, the victim has the
right to be represented by personal counsel at the victim’s expense . . . . A victim has a right
to recover damages from a governmental entity responsible for the intentional, knowing or
grossly negligent violation of the victim’s rights . . . .”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-11 (West
2010) (“If a person acting under color of state law willfully or wantonly fails to perform duties
so that the rights in this chapter are not provided, an action for injunctive relief, including
prospective injunctive relief, may be brought . . . .”). Illinois employs a good faith standard.
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/4(a)(10) (West 2010) (“Crime victims shall have the
following rights . . . [t]he right to restitution.”); id. 120/9 (“This Act does not . . . grant any
person a cause of action for damages or attorneys fees. Any act of omission or commission by
any law enforcement officer . . . or State’s Attorney . . . or other State agency . . . acting in
good faith in rendering crime victim’s assistance . . . shall not impose civil liability . . . .”).
451

MO. ANN. STAT. § 595.209(1)(11) (West 2010) (“The following rights shall
automatically be afforded to victims of dangerous felonies . . . victims of murder in the first
degree . . . victims of voluntary manslaughter . . . and, upon written request, the following
rights shall be afforded to victims of all other crimes . . . . For victims, to be informed by the
prosecuting attorney of the right to restitution which shall be enforceable in the same manner
as any other cause of action as otherwise provided by law . . . .”); id. § 595.218 (“Nothing . . .
shall be construed as creating a cause of action on behalf of any person against any public
employee, public agency, the state or any agency responsible for the enforcement of rights and
provisions . . . .”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1107 (West 2010) (while Arkansas does not
appear to explicitly give a right to restitution or compensation, this statute, found in the Rights
of Victims of Crime subchapter in the Criminal Procedure Statutes, states that “a law
enforcement agency responsible for investigating a crime . . . shall promptly give in writing to
the victim . . . [a]n explanation of the victim’s rights . . . [and] [i]nformation concerning the
availability of . . . [c]ompensation for victims . . . .”); id. § 16-90-1102 (found in the Rights of
Victims of Crime Subchapter of the Judgment and Sentence Generally Chapter in the Criminal
Procedure Generally Statutes) (“Failure to comply . . . does not create a claim for
damages . . . .”); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“In all criminal prosecutions, a victim, as the
General Assembly may define by law, shall have the following rights: . . . the right to
restitution which shall be enforceable in the same manner as any other cause of action or as
otherwise provided by law . . . .”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-85g (West 2010) (“In order to
ensure that any victim coming before the court has been advised of the victim’s constitutional
rights, any judge of the Superior Court shall . . . issue the following advisement: ‘If you are a
victim of a crime with a case pending before this court, you are advised that you have the right
. . . to restitution . . . .’”); id. § 54-224 (“[T]he state or any agent, employee or officer thereof
shall not be liable for (1) the failure to afford the victim of a crime any of the rights provided
. . . .”).
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right to direct the prosecution, states should follow the Alabama policy requiring
prosecutors to make reasonable efforts to confer with victims about possible plea
agreements.452 Such conferences could typically include discussions of available
avenues of recovery as well as possible recovery in the pending case.
A crime victim’s opportunity to pursue recovery in a criminal case can also be
facilitated through independent offices designed to aid crime victims. Utah, for
example, has a victims’ rights committee.453 That committee helps enforce crime
victim rights, including monetary recoveries inside and outside of pending criminal
cases.454
States can also facilitate crime victim recoveries by making available and
encouraging the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms before criminal
pleas are finalized. For example, a state could invite a crime victim to mediation, as
in Delaware where a crime victim can pursue restitution in a nonadversarial
environment.455 Victim offender mediation programs have been described as
“empowering victims” and “promoting restitution to the victim.”456 It has also been
said that such programs increase crime victim recoveries because restorative justice
practices, such as victim-offender mediation, have substantially higher compliance
and collection rates than judicial orders.457
452

ALA. CODE § 15-23-71 (“The victim has the right to be present at any proceeding at
which a negotiated plea for the person accused of committing the criminal offense against the
victim will be presented to the court. The court shall not accept a plea agreement unless: (1)
The prosecuting attorney advises the court that, before requesting the negotiated plea,
reasonable efforts were made to confer with the victim. (2) Reasonable efforts are made to
give the victim notice of . . . the terms of any sentence agreed to as part of the negotiated
plea . . . .”).
453

UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-37-5.

454

Id. § 77-38-11 (“[A]ny Victims’ Rights Committee . . . may . . . bring an action for
declaratory relief or for a writ of mandamus defining or enforcing the rights of victims and the
obligations of government entities . . . [and] petition to file an amicus brief in any court in any
case affecting crime victims . . . .”).
455
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9501(b) (West 2010) (“It is the intent of the General
Assembly that each program established . . . [s]timulate the establishment and use of victimoffender mediation programs to help meet the need for alternatives to the courts for the
resolution of certain criminal offenses, whether before or after adjudication . . . .”); id. §
9501(a) (“The General Assembly finds and declares that . . . [t]he resolution of felony,
misdemeanor and juvenile delinquent disputes can be costly and complex . . . [and] [v]ictimoffender mediation programs can meet the needs of Delaware’s citizens by providing forums
in which persons may voluntarily participate in the resolution of certain criminal
offenses . . . .”). See also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.13 (West 2010) (“The victim
services division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice shall . . . provide mediation
services . . . if requested by a victim . . . .”).
456
Dickman, supra note 129, at 1715 (quoting Nancy Lucas, Restitution, Rehabilitation,
Prevention and Transformation: Victim Offender Mediation for First-Time Non-Violent
Youthful Offenders, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1365, 1375 (2001)).
457

Id. at 1715 (citing Mark S. Unbreit, Mediating Victim-Offender Conflict: From SingleSite to Multi-Site Analysis in the U.S., in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ON TRIAL: PITFALLS AND
POTENTIALS OF VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION - INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES 431,
432-36 (Heinz Messmer & Hans-Uwe Otto eds. 1992)).
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V. CONCLUSION
Crime victim recoveries are typically available in American states through three
separate, but related, avenues: a criminal case (with or without a formal charge); a
related civil case (including a presuit settlement); and a related administrative or
special court proceeding. Multiple avenues can be pursued simultaneously. These
avenues often have constitutional as well as statutory foundations.
Unfortunately, crime victims often go without recovery. Barriers to recovery
include intrastate and interstate confusion over terms like restitution and victim,
failures to recognize constitutional rights as self-executing, and the unavailability of
provisional remedies.
More can be done for victims, especially during criminal case sentencing, to
overcome these barriers. Unlike federal district courts, state criminal courts typically
have general jurisdictional authority allowing broader opportunities for crime victim
recoveries at the close of criminal cases. Better crime victim recovery procedures
are especially warranted where there are constitutional interests. Enhanced
procedures should include mandated considerations of crime victim interests at
criminal case sentencing; broader opportunities for provisional remedies; priorities
for crime victims when the assets of perpetrators are limited; and independent crime
victim assistance officers.
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